

Collateral Damages of Military Operations in Nigeria

Muhammad Abdullahi Maigari^{1,a,*}

¹Al-Qalam University, Katsina, Nigeria

^akariyoma2@yahoo.com

*Corresponding author

Article Info

Received: 2-Aug-2025

Revised: 30-Aug-2025

Published: 8-Sept-2025

Keywords

Collateral Damage; Compensation;
Innocent Civilians; Military
Operations; Punishment

Abstract

The paper has chronologically documented all incidences of collateral damage caused by military operations in Nigeria. From 2009 to 2025, military personnel, alongside other armed forces, were deployed to different parts of Nigeria as part of a strategy for internal security management. In the course of discharging their duty, the Nigerian forces missed their targets and their attacks hit defenceless civilians nineteen times. This research aims to identify the causal factors for collateral damage in internal security operations by the Nigerian military in Nigeria and to examine its implications. To explore redress options for the victims or their relatives. An explanatory research design is adopted to explain the episodic collateral damage that military operations cause, especially in Northern Nigeria. The findings revealed that a total of 19 episodes of collateral damage occurred in Nigeria and all in Northern Nigeria, because that is where the military has been battling with different non-state actors who took up arms against the government and those who have been kidnapping people for ransom, killing people, and stealing their livestock. Also, operational negligence was identified as one of the major causes of collateral damage in Nigeria because all of the fighter jets possessed by the Nigerian military have high definition cameras that can view images accurately regardless of the distance to the ground; hence, the operators are supposed to distinguish between armed & unarmed people on the ground. Another factor is operational recklessness because they are supposed to differentiate between settlements/villages of terrorists and non-targeted villages before launching an attack. Therefore, it is recommended that the Federal Government, which has all the armed forces in Nigeria under its control, should ensure that they are well-trained to protect civilians when carrying out air raids to avoid collateral damage at all costs. Members of the National Assembly should enact laws that specifically punish security operatives who, out of negligence or deliberately, kill defenceless civilians or non-targets of attacks during military operations.

1. Introduction

From 2009 to 2025, Nigeria and other countries in West Africa and Cameroon in Central Africa are immersed with both internal and border terrorism. Islamic fundamentalist groups have established a base in the sub-region, operating across the national borders of the Niger Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Chad. In an attempt to crush the insurgents, these countries have adopted military strategies. The strategies adopted were accompanied by collateral damage, killing civilians when launching attacks on the terrorists or insurgents. Nigeria has been at the epicentre of the fight against Islamic fundamentalism in West Africa because the Boko Haram group had its roots and the pioneers' leaders in Nigeria. The air component of the Nigerian military was deployed to various parts of Nigeria affected by the terrorist activities. In the discharge of their duties, sometimes, the military miss their targets and kill innocent and defenceless civilians. Killing of civilians in an attempt to kill the enemies in wartime is not only common in Nigeria, but developed countries that are known for sophisticated military technologies, such as the USA, the United Kingdom, and other European countries, were accused of causing collateral

damage on the battlefield. In this sense, collateral damage is synonymous with a military airstrike in wartime, regardless of the level of development of a country.

The killing of innocent civilians during a military operation is referred to as incidental civilian loss, injury, and damage. Collateral damage is one side of the proportionality 'equation'. Expected incidental civilian losses (is known interchangeably as collateral damage) are balanced against the anticipated military value of the strike. This balancing, i.e., proportionality, is one of the major factors in the law of targeting (Holland, 2004). Therefore, collateral damage refers to the unintended harm inflicted on civilians, their property, or non-military targets during military operations. Understanding and addressing these factors is essential (Uldag, 2024) in winning the war against terrorists and other forms of criminals, regardless of the time and place of the operations.

For example, it has been observed by Trumbull (2025) that the tragic war in Gaza has focused the world's attention on the humanitarian consequences of armed conflict. Residential buildings, schools, places of worship, and hospitals have been destroyed. Tens of thousands of civilians, including children, have been killed, and much of the Palestinian population has been displaced. While the sheer number of civilian casualties has prompted moral condemnation, many of these civilian deaths were likely inflicted consistent with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the legal framework that governs the conduct of hostilities in armed conflict. IHL prohibits the direct targeting of civilians and civilian objects, but it permits incidental harm to civilians (collateral damage) in connection with attacks against military objectives. IHL's principle of proportionality, the rule of IHL that addresses collateral damage, only prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects that would be excessive about the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

This research's central focus or objectives are to identify the causal factors for collateral damage in internal security operations by the Nigerian military in Nigeria, and to examine its implications. To explore redress options for the victims or their relatives. What are the causes of collateral damage? What is the effect of collateral damage on the victims? What is the available redress for the victims or their relatives? The objectives of the study are to explore how air strikes in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria from 2009 to 2025 killed civilians by government forces deployed. Also, to examine how the military can reduce or prevent harm to civilians during aerial bombing campaigns in any part of Nigeria.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Causes of Collateral Damage

In some wars, protecting civilians is not a concern or part of the military strategies for success in their campaign. This was what happened in Afghanistan, where coalition forces under the US military do not value the lives of the Afghans in their military operations against the Taliban and other Jihadists (Gregory, 2025). Air-dropped bombs are extremely powerful, with a large destructive capacity when used in populated areas. In general, most air-dropped bombs cause a supersonic over-pressurisation shock wave that can blow apart buildings and kill and injure people hundreds of metres from the point of detonation. A total of 6,157 airstrikes were recorded by AOAV's Explosive Violence Monitor from 2011 to 2020, over 28 different countries. In total, these caused 83,964 casualties. 56% of these (46,888) were civilians. Twenty-six thousand seven hundred fifty-five of the civilian casualties were fatal - 57% - meaning if an airstrike hurt a civilian, they were more likely to die than to survive. A majority (51% or 3,120) of airstrikes occurred within populated areas. Forty-six thousand five hundred sixty-one total casualties resulted from these strikes. Of these, 90% (41,978) were civilians. Three hundred ninety-eight incidents were listed as not in populated areas, resulting in 8,087 casualties. From these, just 2% (149) were civilians. There were 2,640 incidents when it was unclear whether the area bombed was populated. Of the casualties caused by these, 16 % (4,761 of 29,316) were civilians. These were most likely non-populated (Action on Armed Violence, 2021).

2.2. Redress for the Victims/Survivors of Collateral Damage

The mistakes resulting in civilian harm can put the entire mission at risk. Gen. David Petraeus's tactical directive to his forces in Afghanistan said, "Every civilian death diminishes our cause." U.S. failures to limit civilian harm in Afghanistan led Gen. Stanley McChrystal to say, "We're going to lose this fucking war if we

don't stop killing civilians." Mitigating the risks of civilian casualties also helps to focus operational effects on degrading the enemy throughout a conflict. For example, precision munitions can improve lethality against enemy forces while minimising risks to civilian lives and structures. Detailed understanding of a civilian environment and a sustained dynamic common operating picture across battlefield domains helps anticipate potential civilian risks, improves course of action selection and targeting, and reduces blind spots that can lead to mistaking civilians for targetable combatants. Assessments and investigations of civilian harm can provide lessons that reduce the likelihood of future incidents, improving military Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for striking adversary forces and protecting our forces. This is not speculation but rather evidence-based analysis captured in multiple DOD-sponsored studies. Furthermore, Allen et.al contend that 2021 air strikes by the government often cause deaths through collateral killings. Yet, when air strikes occur in countries where human rights organisations are active, these civilian deaths may be mitigated.

2.3. Effects of Collateral Damage

It has been observed that the rights of civilians and civilian objects have, throughout the various conflicts in Nigeria, been violated. An empirical study was conducted by Aduku (2021), which collected data from numerous real-life case studies from Nigeria. The study has identified a legal constraint in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the insufficient and unproductive enforcement mechanisms, which essentially amount to the poor enforcement of International Humanitarian Law concerning armed conflicts in Nigeria. Finally, recommendations were made to ensure domestication of all international humanitarian laws applicable to protecting civilians and civilian objects and strengthen the several enforcement mechanisms to ensure proper application of International Humanitarian laws in Nigeria (Aduku, 2021).

In Nigeria, the fight against insurgency has necessitated military operations aimed at neutralising insurgent threats and restoring peace and stability. However, these operations have often resulted in significant civilian casualties and the destruction of property, thus raising serious concerns about compliance with the proportionality principle. The study revealed that many of the collateral damages and disproportionate attacks incurred by the security agencies of the Nigerian state were not compensated for. The researchers discovered insufficient legal frameworks to protect or provide compensation for victims of such human and humanitarian rights violations. While a strong response to extremist threats is essential, Nigeria's strategies must adhere to proportionality to avoid disproportionate impacts on civilians and uphold the rule of law. The study recommended a call for appropriate stakeholders to aid the Nigerian government's competence in discharging its security mandate in a highly vulnerable polity (Albert & Akinbode, 2024).

Wilke (2021) reveals a "decorative" use of IHL: the reports assert and presume compliance with IHL but do not use IHL as a legal standard. This decorative use of international law paves the way for a standardised language of "regret" and "tragedy" that refuses responsibility for the deaths of civilians. The US military strike that devastated the MSF hospital in Kunduz in northern Afghanistan on 3 October generated profound, if short-lived, outrage in much of the world. The US government promised an investigation and appointed a military panel in late October. Its investigation is unlikely to address the more fundamental questions this attack raises: Why have the US airstrikes repeatedly produced catastrophic cases of "collateral damage" in Afghanistan? How, if at all, can the civilian impact of such means and methods of warfare be reduced, not only in the continued conflict in Afghanistan, but also in similar airstrikes in Iraq and Syria? (Suhrke, 2015).

According to Astri (2015), armed conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has inflicted tremendous costs on civilians. Some of the deaths and injuries have been the direct, but unintended, consequences of specific Western military operations, mainly the United States. For example, on 1st July 2002, American warplanes killed civilians at a Uruzgan wedding party in Afghanistan. It was found that 89 persons had been killed and up to 200 injured, all civilians.

Astri (2015) reported that US planes bombed Garani village in Farah province, Afghanistan. They dropped five 500-pound bombs and two 2000-pound bombs – enough to destroy multiple airfields. The UN and the Afghan human rights commission recorded 80 civilian deaths. A subsequent investigation by CENTCOM concluded that only 26 civilians were killed, while the remaining 78 were insurgents. This time, there was consensus that fighting had taken place in the area; in fact, US and Afghan forces had called in air

support while waiting to evacuate two of their wounded. The bombers arrived at nightfall, and the crew had observed suspicious movements in the area, “similarly-sized adults moving tactically, definitively and rapidly in evenly spaced intervals across difficult terrain in the dark,” the CENTCOM report stated. Believing they were Taliban fighters heading for shelter in a building, the planes attacked. The version told by villagers differed: the Taliban had left the village by the time the planes arrived, and the people had been running to the mosque for shelter.

The attack on Azizabad village, which resulted in several hundred civilian casualties caused by US airstrikes six years earlier, was followed by another devastating and controversial assault in the western province of Herat. US forces had been informed that the Taliban were organising a large meeting in the small village of Azizabad and attacked with their own troops and Afghan forces, aided by close air support. When the dust settled, around 90 civilians, mostly children, had been killed, and many more injured, according to investigations by the UN, Afghan NGOs, international NGOs, and the Red Cross. Most of the casualties resulted from airstrikes (Astri, 2015).

Collateral damages were reported by Airwars (2015), who found that between August 8th, 2014, and June 30th, 2015, the Coalition carried out 3,034 airstrikes in Iraq. With an average of 3.4 weapon releases per airstrike across the whole campaign, this suggests that approximately 10,000 munitions were released by Coalition aircraft in Iraq during this period. US aircraft were responsible for some 68 per cent (2,022 strikes) of all actions in Iraq, with other Coalition partners carrying out a further 962 strikes to June 27th. The UK was the next most active partner, carrying out 226 airstrikes. Coalition actions initially focused on Daesh forces concentrated in rural areas – for example, around the Haditha Dam, or at Mount Sinjar. However, most airstrikes soon shifted to those urban conurbations seized by militants in the summer of 2014. Mosul is the most heavily bombed location in Iraq, with more than 670 international airstrikes recorded in the vicinity between August and June. Unsurprisingly, claims of civilians killed by Coalition aircraft also peak in the city, with more than 40 per cent of all reported civilian casualty incidents (representing 216 to 285 alleged deaths) recorded for Mosul.

In Syria, the Coalition had conducted 1,890 airstrikes, which saw the release of an estimated 7,000 bombs and missiles. The United States carried out 94 per cent of these attacks (1,719), with just 109 allied airstrikes recorded.¹⁵ In many weeks, only US aircraft have been carrying out strikes in Syria. Arab nations led by Saudi Arabia have instead switched to operations against Houthi rebels in Yemen, where reports of high numbers of civilian casualties from airstrikes persist (Airwars, 2015).

Despite significantly fewer coalition airstrikes in Syria than Iraq, the number of alleged events is markedly higher, with 65 incidents of concern reported between September 23rd, 2014, and June 30th, 2015. From these, a total of 291-354 civilian deaths have been attributed to Coalition actions (Airwars, 2015). A study conducted on the war against Boko Haram in Nigeria by Musa (2022) has concluded that the Federal Government of Nigeria has deployed different agencies to Northeast Nigeria to combat the Islamic terrorist group. Still, in their operations, they show no regard for the rights of children. Domestic and international conventions and treaties do not properly protect the children.

3. Methodology

An explanatory research design is adopted to explain the episodic collateral damage that military operations cause, especially in Northern Nigeria. The rationale behind the choice of the research design is to enable the researcher to give an account for the occurrence of collateral damage and explain how the victims of the attacks feel and how it can be averted in future occurrences, on one hand, and how to assuage the suffering of the victims of collateral damage. The research collected secondary data from different sources documenting collateral damage from 2009 to 2025. The data were sourced from online newspapers and other social media platforms. Thematic analysis is adopted for the analysis of the data because it is a flexible method used for qualitative data to identify, analyse, and report patterns (themes) within data.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Data Analysis Results

The central focus of this research is on civilians killed by security agencies or operatives deployed to areas affected by armed violence in Nigeria. The causes of the collateral damage, effects, and extant measures to seek redress for the victims and survivors of the damage. Survivors in this context refer to the relatives, children, or spouse of those who were killed by the attacks. The data presented below were secondary data sourced from secondary sources that are not classified. The data provided a chronological series of attacks by the military in different parts of Nigeria that missed their targets and ransacked civilian communities which resulting in collateral damage.

Table 1. Chronology of Collateral Damage in Nigeria

Date	Location/State	Deaths
January 2025	Silame LGA, Sokoto	10
27:09:2024	Kaduna State	24
03:12:2023	Tudun Biri, Kaduna State	120
24:01:2023	Doma, Nasarawa State	40
January 2023	Galadima Kogo in Niger State	12
25:12:2025	Tungar Kara, Zamfara state	10
17:12: 2022	Mutumji, Zamfara state	64
03:03:2023	Sabon Gida village, Fatika District, Giwa, Kaduna State.	3
August 2023	Kwaki, Niger State	1
24:01:2023	Galkogo, Niger State	18
06:07:2022	Kunkunni, Katsina State,	2
20:04:2022	Kuragba community, Niger State	6
26:09:2021	Kwatar Daban Masara, Borno State	20
16:09: 2021	Buwari, Yobe State	9
02:07:2019	Gajigana village and Mainok, Borno State	13 Civilians
25:04:2021		30 Soldiers
11:04:2019	Ajia, Birnin Magaji, Zamfara State	11
28:02:2018	Daglan, Borno State	20
17:01: 2017	Rann, Borno State	53
16:03:2014	Kayamla, Borno State	10
	Total	476

The table showed that from 2014 to 2025, airstrikes by the military had mistakenly targeted their targets, not least 18 times. Borno State has the highest number of airstrikes that missed the military targets because the State is the centre of the operation of Boko Haram insurgents, which started in 2009. Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Niger, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Yobe States were other affected States in Northern Nigeria by the operational error by the military, which led to the deaths of 446 civilians and 30 soldiers. This explained the level of negligence and operational inaccuracy on the side of the military (both the Nigerian Air Force and Nigerian Army) in the States they were deployed to protect the citizens. The Airstrikes failed to distinguish civilians from the criminals or terrorists.

Similarly, from 2014 to 2023, Daily Trust Newspaper captured no fewer than 416 unarmed citizens killed by accidental airstrikes of the Nigerian military within the space of 9 years in 16 communities located in the northern region of the country. The level of collateral damages in Nigeria could be attributed to the unprofessionalism and negligence by the military as a result of the following reasons advanced by Cherry, et.al. (2021) tasking a drone in advance of the attack to monitor a potential target for the presence of civilians in and around that target; tasking a second drone to scan-out and look for transients at the time of attack while the primary drone focuses on precise weapons delivery; and selecting a weapon with less blast effect where the integrity of civilian structures in vicinity of the target area is at particular risk

4.2. Discussion

The findings revealed that from the inception of the fight against insurgency and other organised criminals in Nigeria, a total of 446 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed in Northern Nigeria.

The collateral damage took place in the North because the security challenges that required the use of an airstrike are in the North, which included the Boko Haram insurgency, armed banditry, and kidnapping of people for ransom. Similarly, the results revealed 20 mistakes of airstrikes in 11 years of internal security management in the Northeast, Northwest, and North Central Nigeria. The reasons behind missing targets by the air components of the Nigerian military, particularly the Air Force and Army, are (a) negligence by the military in carrying out reconnaissance surveillance before launching the attacks in areas where there are civilians. (b) A lack of adequate communication between the ground forces and the crew operating the fighter jets. This means that one of the major causes of collateral damage in Nigeria was negligence because all the Nigerian military fighter jets have high-definition cameras that view images accurately regardless of the distance. Also, the military acted recklessly because they were supposed to distinguish between the gathering or settlement of terrorists or criminals before launching an attack.

In line with the above, in some of the areas where collateral damage occurred in Nigeria, as a result of public outcry on the level of fatalities, social and psychological harm caused, Kaduna and Federal Government have begun, as part of compensation efforts, to disburse funds to victims and implement some promised social and infrastructural projects in the community, including the construction of a healthcare center, roads and water supply in Tudun Biri. The projects are regarded as a positive step towards ameliorating the effects of the damage caused by the attacks. However, according to the Human Rights Watch (2024), the projects in the areas affected by the collateral damage in Nigeria fall short of addressing the full scale of the tragedy for the victims, some of whom suffered life-changing injuries. While these compensatory measures may bring some benefits, they do little to address the need for genuine justice for the victims and reform in military operations (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

This is in line with the findings of Kern (1995), who identified some of the causes of mistakes in airstrikes when targeting an enemy at the battlefield. They are (1) decision-making errors, (2) situational awareness errors, (3) procedural errors, and (4) crew coordination errors, in that order of frequency of occurrence. Common errors occurred in greater than 10 per cent of the incidents and include (1) communications errors, (2) pressing too far, (3) regulatory deviation, (4) flight lead errors, and (5) weather-related errors.

The practical implications of the findings of this research are that an uncountable number of people were killed as a result of avoidable operational mistakes or negligence by the Nigerian military. These led to the death and destruction of property, which left the relatives or survivors of the attack in social, economic, and psychological trauma. Some of the survivors in different places in Nigeria have become permanently deformed, and the absence of support from the Government in the form of compensation or assistance for the damage done to, further plunges the survivors of the collateral damage to resort to begging on the street or dying of hunger and lack medical attention.

5. Conclusion

Evidence from the documented incidents of collateral damage in Nigeria is sufficient to conclude that all the collateral damage was a result of (a) the military was certain that the attacks may lead to the death of innocent persons, but launched them. (b) Some of the military personnel acted recklessly, as in the case of Tudun Biri in Kaduna State, where the military was aware of the risk of harm to the civilians, but acted recklessly. Another aspect of collateral damage observed in Nigeria was negligence on the part of the military personnel regarding the high risk of harm from the attacks on criminals that may affect the non-targeted population.

It has been observed from the data generated by the military operations targeting Boko Haram insurgents and other armed criminals in Nigeria from 1999-2025, the attacks have generated complaints because of the number of deaths of innocent civilians. The military has not demonstrated high professionalism from one incident to the next, leading the public to conclude that the operational failures were deliberate and reckless. Also, the absence of a law that punishes or compels the military to be accountable for the deaths of civilians killed by their personnel has opened the window for operational laxity in Nigeria, since they are not going to pay for the damages.

Connected to the above, in 16 years (2009-2025) of the fight against terrorism in Nigeria, the Federal Government of Nigeria or the military authority has not punished any erring military personnel for collateral damage. The absence of punishment led to negligence during operations or airstrikes that often

led to the death of non-combatants in the violence. This implies that the Nigerian military has been operating without recourse or regard to the established rules of operation in civilian-occupied areas. Identifying targets with high precision to avert or minimise harm to the non-target of attack. This is because the international humanitarian law (IHL) states that a commander must assess, based on information available before launching an attack, whether the means and methods used are indiscriminate or disproportionate, and whether all feasible precautions have been taken to minimise civilian harm.

The rule of proportionality prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive about the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. An important point is that the rule is not limited to death and injuries. Still, that damage to civilian objects should also not be excessive about the military advantage anticipated. The rule requires that, in the context of each attack, a prior assessment must be made as to the exposure to, and level of, injury or damage that civilians or infrastructure may suffer due to the attack, and then weigh this against the anticipated military gain. This includes considering the target itself, its vicinity, and the weaponry used in the attack (Camilla, 2011). Thus, whether an attack is legal depends partly on whether the principle of proportionality was respected when the operation targeting the military objective was carried out (Sahr, 2016). In this sense, the Nigerian military in both airstrikes and land warfare has exhibited a high degree of disregard for all domesticated international laws and treaties regulating the conduct of armed personnel at the warfront. The collateral damages, unlike the damages caused by the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, in Nigeria, it is an internal security management where the Federal Government of Nigeria has been battling different types of armed criminals and terrorists. None of the perpetrators of collateral damage caused by the military attacks in Nigeria have been punished from 2009 to 2025. The absence of codified law that prescribes punishment for any military personnel, either by airstrike or land warfare kill or injure non-civilian targets. This is why the continuous occurrence of target missing and killing of civilians is attributed to the lack of punishment for dereliction of duty and responsibilities in ensuring accuracy, efficiency, and probity that maximise harm to the civilians whom the military is deployed to protect and restore peace in different parts of Nigeria.

References

- Action on Armed Violence (2021). *An anatomy of an airstrike*. Research and publication funded by the Government of Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Aduku, O. (2021). Protection of civilians and civilian objects in non-international armed conflict: Case study of Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa (ISWAP) Conflicts in Nigeria. *Available at SSRN 4009111*.
- Airwars (2015). *Cause for concern: civilians killed in coalition strikes*. 1-35.
- Albert, O. O. & Akinbode, O. E. (2024). Proportionality in Nigeria's battle against insurgency. *Fuoye Journal Of Criminology And Security Studies*, 3(1).
- Allen, S. H., Bell, S. R., & Martinez Machain, C. (2021). Air power, NGOs, and collateral killings. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 17(2), oraa025.
- Astri, S (2015). Protection of civilians: Why they die in US strikes. *CMI Brief November 14 (7)*.
- Camilla, W. (2011). *Protection of civilians under international humanitarian law: Trends and Challenges*. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
- [Cherry, J., Tinkler, K. & Schmitt, M.\(2021\). Avoiding collateral damage on the battlefield. https://www.justsecurity.org/74619/avoiding-collateral-damage-on-the-battlefield/](https://www.justsecurity.org/74619/avoiding-collateral-damage-on-the-battlefield/)
- Daily Trust (Dec. 9, 2023). Inside the military's 16 airstrike 'errors' on citizens in 9 years. <https://dailytrust.com/inside-militarys-16-airstrike-errors-on-citizens-in-9-years/>
- Dinstein, Y. (2005). Collateral damage and the principle of proportionality. In *New Wars, New Laws? Applying Laws of War in 21st Century Conflicts* (pp. 211-224).
- Gilbert, E. (2015). The gift of war: Cash, counterinsurgency, and 'collateral damage'. *Security Dialogue*, 46(5), 403-421.
- Gregory, T. (2025). *Weaponising civilian protection: Counterinsurgency and collateral damage in Afghanistan*. Oxford University Press.
- Holland, J. (2004). Military objective and collateral damage: Their relationship and dynamics. *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 7, 35-78.

- Human Rights Watch (2024). Nigeria airstrike victims need justice: Authorities should establish a clear compensation process, ensure military accountability. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/05/nigeria-airstrike-victims-need-justice>
- Kern, A.T. (1995). *A historical analysis of u. S. Air Force tactical aircrew error in operations Desert Shield/Storm*. Unpublished thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Art and Science, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- Musa, A. O. (2022). *The protection of children under international law during non-international armed conflict: Case study on the international responsibility of the state of Nigeria in the face of Boko Haram attacks*. Unpublished Master's Thesis submitted to the Near East University Institute of Graduate Studies International Law Program.
- Sahr, M. (2016). Minimising civilian harm in populated areas: Lessons from examining ISAF and AMISOM policies. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 98(1), 225–248.
- Suhrke, A. (2015). Protection of civilians: Why they die in US strikes. *CMI Brief*.
- Trumbull IV, C. P. (2025). Collateral damage and individual rights in armed conflict. *Fordham International Law Journal*, 48(2), 521.
- Uldag, K. (2024). The impact of collateral damage: Unravelling psychological mechanisms in the context of war and conflict: A literature review. *Scientific Studies on Social and Political Psychology*, 30(1), 90-94. doi: 10.61727/ssppj/1.2024.90.
- Wilke, C. (2021). Legal tragedies: US military reporting on civilian casualties of airstrikes, in *Alexandra Moore and James Dawes (editors), Technologies of Human Rights Representation*. SUNY Press.