

# Threat Analysis of Khilafatul Muslimin's Existence as A Radical Organization in Indonesia

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## Abstract

Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) is an organization established with the aim of founding a caliphate or *khilafah*, a system of governance based on an exclusive interpretation of Islamic leadership principles. This group promotes an ideology of the caliphate that contradicts Pancasila, Indonesia's foundational ideology, by advocating for governance rooted solely in Islamic law and singular Islamic leadership. It rejects Indonesia's principles of pluralism and democracy. The continuous efforts by KM to establish a caliphate pose a potential threat to Indonesia's sovereignty. This study aims to analyze the threats posed by KM and propose intelligence strategies to address their presence in society. A descriptive qualitative research method was employed, grounded in an inductive perspective. The analysis, based on Hank Prunckun's threat assessment framework, indicates that the threat posed by KM is at a medium level. Further threat analysis reveals that KM has the threat factors outlined by Kevin Riehle including intent, capability, and opportunity. These findings are supported by insights from perspective of the Terrorist Mindset developed by Randy Borum.

## 1. Introduction

Terrorism has evolved into a global phenomenon, posing significant challenges to societies worldwide, including Indonesia. From 2000 to 2020, Indonesia witnessed 638 incidents of terrorism, with the highest number of cases occurring in 2001. Despite a downward trend over the past two decades, terrorism remains a persistent threat, with 19 incidents recorded in 2020 alone. This continuing menace, characterized by its unpredictable and often violent nature, has had a profound impact on the psychological, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of affected communities (Annur, 2022). In the modern digital era, the landscape of terrorism has shifted dramatically, with terrorist groups increasingly leveraging technology and social media to further their agendas. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube have become essential tools for these groups, allowing them to spread propaganda, recruit new members, secure funding, plan and execute attacks and evade law enforcement. The accessibility and widespread reach of these platforms have made them powerful instruments for disseminating radical ideologies and coordinating terror activities.

Previous studies have extensively explored the use of social media by extremist groups, focusing primarily on how these platforms are used to disseminate propaganda, recruit followers, and foster radicalization. For instance, Maura Conway et al. (2019) examined how right-wing extremist groups use social media for these purposes, emphasizing their use of technology to expand their influence. In contrast, this research aims to explore how Indonesia's Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terrorism Unit (Densus 88) leverages these same platforms to monitor and prevent terrorist activities, thus offering a law enforcement perspective that has been less frequently studied. In addition to Maura Conway's work, research by Lars Lindekilde, Stefan Malthaner, and Francis O'Connor (2019) delved into relational patterns in the

radicalization process of lone actors. Their study examined the formation of connections via social media that contribute to individual radicalization. While these studies have been vital in understanding the processes through which terrorism is nurtured online, they focus predominantly on the terrorist actors themselves. The current research differentiates itself by shifting focus toward the law enforcement side, examining how Densus 88 identifies and monitors terrorist networks on social media, using relational patterns to preempt potential attacks.

Furthermore, other studies have employed advanced technologies such as deep learning and artificial intelligence to analyze terrorist activities on social media. For example, J.G.D. Harb and K. Becker (2020) utilized deep learning algorithms to analyze emotional reactions to terrorist events on platforms like Twitter. Their approach relies heavily on automated data analysis, whereas this study emphasizes manual approaches and the specific strategies employed by Densus 88 to analyze terrorist threats. Similarly, research by Miriam Fernandez and Harith Alani (2021) focused on using AI to predict and analyze extremist content on social media, aiming to detect radicalization trends through advanced technological tools. While these studies have made significant contributions to the field, they concentrate on automated, large-scale analysis. In contrast, the current research underscores the use of both manual methods and technology employed by law enforcement personnel in Indonesia to detect extremism. Lastly, the study by M. Gaikwad et al. (2021) explored general techniques and tools for detecting online extremism, focusing on global trends in identifying extremist activities across various platforms. However, the present research specifically addresses the unique tools and methodologies used by Densus 88 in the Indonesian context, focusing on how these methods are applied to counter-terrorism within the country.

Thus, the uniqueness of this study lies in its focus on law enforcement's use of social media as a tool for monitoring and preventing terrorist activities, as opposed to solely examining how extremists use these platforms to promote violence. By focusing on Densus 88's efforts in Indonesia, this research offers an in-depth look at how counter-terrorism operations are adapting to the digital age, employing both manual and technological approaches to identify, analyze, and prevent terrorist activities. The main issue that forms the foundation of this research is the increasing use of social media by terrorist groups in Indonesia and around the world, as well as the challenges faced by law enforcement agencies in monitoring and responding to these activities. Terrorist organizations have easily exploited the open and anonymous nature of social media platforms to disseminate radical ideologies, coordinate attacks, and recruit new members, all without being detected by authorities.

The fact that social media allows for fast and anonymous access makes early detection of terrorism-related threats much more difficult. Terrorists no longer need physical meeting places to plan attacks; instead, they can simply access social media platforms from remote locations. In certain cases, these individuals can even conceal their real identities, making detection more challenging for law enforcement. Additionally, the cooperation between governments and social media platforms remains a challenge, as stronger efforts are required to monitor and remove content that leads to radicalization and violence. On the other hand, although Densus 88 has begun utilizing social media as an intelligence-gathering tool, there are significant challenges related to making this monitoring process effective. The volume and complexity of data generated from social media are vast, requiring sophisticated algorithms and efficient data processing systems to identify relevant information quickly and accurately. This becomes even more complex when distinguishing between genuinely dangerous activities and unrelated content. Additionally, ethical considerations, such as balancing security concerns with privacy rights, add further complexity to the use of these monitoring tools.

This research aims to explore how Densus 88 utilizes social media platforms to identify, monitor, and analyze activities related to terrorism. By employing a qualitative approach, this study will examine the experiences and perspectives of Densus 88 personnel who are directly involved in using social media as an intelligence tool. The findings from this study are expected to provide valuable insights into the strategic use of social media in counter-terrorism operations, offering recommendations for improving the effectiveness of intelligence-gathering efforts in the digital age. In the broader context of the digital era, terrorism has evolved to include the use of sophisticated digital tools and platforms to advance its goals. While law enforcement agencies worldwide struggle to keep pace with these technological advancements, Densus 88's efforts in Indonesia offer a unique example of how social media can be leveraged to monitor and counter-terrorism. By focusing on the specific context of Indonesia and the manual and technological methods employed by Densus 88, this research contributes valuable insights into the ongoing efforts to combat terrorism in the digital age.

## 2. Literature Review

Article 1, point 4 of Constitution No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence states that threats encompass all efforts, actions, activities, or operations, whether originating domestically or internationally, that are deemed or proven to endanger the nation's safety, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as national interests across various domains, including ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, and defense and security. To academically analyze the phenomenon of the Khilafatul Muslimin as a radical organization, this research is grounded in theories and concepts relevant to the topic under study. The study employs several theoretical frameworks, including Threat Analysis by Hank Prunckun, Threat Analysis by Kevin Riehle, and the Terrorist Mindset framework by Randy Borum.

## 3. Method

This study employs a descriptive qualitative approach based on an inductive perspective. The process involves formulating research questions, collecting data through interactions with various individuals, analyzing data from specific observations to broader generalizations, and interpreting the findings by the researcher. The final report of this research can be structured flexibly. Participants in this study support a perspective that values individual thought, focuses on the meanings attributed by people, and acknowledges the complexity of the existing situation (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The researcher considers the descriptive qualitative approach more relevant for providing a deep understanding of the issue under investigation, especially considering the availability of data and challenges encountered during interviews with respondents. The data sources include primary data, such as interview results from various respondents, and secondary data obtained from literature studies.

## 4. Result and Discussion

### 4.1. Khilafatul Muslimin from the Threat Perspective - Hank Prunckun

Based on data obtained through interviews with the Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Members of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni, an analysis was conducted referencing the threat factors outlined by Hank Prunckun including desire, expectation, knowledge, and resources. The results of this analysis are as follows.

Table 1. Threat Analysis Results According to Hank Prunckun

Table 1: Threat Analysis Results According to Rank 1 Ranking				
Component			Scale	Score
Threat	Intent	Desire	High	4.0
		Expectation	High	3.5
	Capability	Knowledge	Medium	2.5
		Resources	High	4.0
	Total Threat Coefficient			

From the data processing results, the total threat coefficient can be converted into the following threat coefficient table:

Table 2. Threat Coefficient Analysis Result

Threat	Coefficient
Negligible	4-6
Minimum	7-10
Medium	11-15
High	16-18
Acute	19-20

Thus, the threat analysis regarding the presence of the Khilafatul Muslimin as a radical organization in Indonesia, based on data from interviews with primary, key, and supporting informants and analyzed using Hank Prunckun's threat analysis framework, influenced by the researcher's subjectivity, indicates a medium-level threat with a score of 14.0.

#### 4.1.1. Desire

The desire factor within the Khilafatul Muslimin can be understood through its core objectives, the enthusiasm of its members toward the organization's goals, and its recruitment processes. The Khilafatul Muslimin's primary aim is to replace Indonesia's foundational ideology, Pancasila, with the system of *Khilafah Islamiyah*, which they regard as the comprehensive and complete implementation of Islamic teachings. Guided by their caliphate proclamation and the concept of ummah unity, they seek to unite all Muslims under leadership based on Islamic law. They assert that the caliphate is not merely a state but a collective unity of the Muslim ummah, which must be established according to the teachings of the Prophet and his companions. Referring to *Quran Surah Ash-Shura* (26:42), the group is committed to upholding Islamic law in all aspects of life, considering it a divine mandate to protect religion and implement Allah's laws, undeterred by the existing national system. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Members of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni).

Furthermore, the enthusiasm of Khilafatul Muslimin members for the organization's goals is evident through their strong and consistent financial support and obedience to its teachings and leadership. Their active participation in raising monthly donations (*infaq*) of up to IDR 70 million reflects their financial commitment. Additionally, KM members display loyalty to their *khalifah*, Abdul Qadir Hasan Baraja, through actions such as refusing to pay property taxes, based on their belief that land belongs to Allah. Their involvement in various activities, including health walks on the 1st of Muharram, weekly study sessions extending to regional levels, and mass attendance at lectures by figures such as Ustadz Zul, demonstrates high dedication to the organization's objectives and values, even as their leadership faces legal challenges. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik)

The recruitment process within the Khilafatul Muslimin operates openly and structurally, despite the organization's exclusive nature. Annually, KM holds a dakwah safari coinciding with the Islamic New Year on the 1st of Muharram, featuring health walks in their distinctive attire while distributing the caliphate proclamation. For those interested in joining, they are directed to meet the amir at the kemasulan level, where they are invited to participate in religious study sessions. Consistent participation leads to an oath-taking ceremony (*bai'at*), which involves pledging allegiance to the leader, requiring obedience as long as the teachings align with the Quran and Hadith. After taking the *bai'at*, new members are obligated to contribute financially (*infaq*) and attend regular study sessions, even at the regional level. The *bai'at* is regarded as a commitment to Allah to uphold Islamic law, avoid falsehoods and other prohibitions in Islam, and be prepared to make sacrifices for the establishment of Allah's and the Prophet's teachings. (Sources: Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Members of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni).

Referring to Hank Prunckun's threat analysis, the data regarding the desire factor can be converted into a threat level scale, and then summed to determine the overall threat level. The coefficient value of the desire factor is illustrated in the following table 3.

#### 4.1.2. Expectation

The expectation factor within the Khilafatul Muslimin can be explained through the motivation of its members to achieve the organization's goals and their support for terrorist groups. The main motivation of Khilafatul Muslimin members in pursuing the group's objectives stems from their deep desire to attain the pleasure of Allah SWT, martyrdom, and entry into paradise, which they believe can be achieved by fighting for the establishment of the caliphate. For them, the caliphate is not just a leadership structure but a form of worship and the implementation of complete Islamic teachings, as they believe was once practiced during the Islamic golden age. The propaganda of the caliphate also appeals to those who long for a united Muslim community under a single leader, in line with their understanding of Hadith and the Qur'an. For Khilafatul Muslimin members, the effort to establish the caliphate is a great responsibility to unite the

ummah, educate society in Islamic teachings, and fulfill the promises of Allah and His Messenger, making it a strong, religious, and spiritual motivation in their every step of struggle. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni).

Table 3. Analysis of the Desire Factor

Components	Sources	Findings	Coefficient
The main objective of the KM movement	Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of KM, Member of KM	The Khilafatul Muslimin aims to replace Pancasila with the <i>Khilafah Islamiyah</i> as the foundation of the state, which they view as a complete implementation of Islamic law ( <i>sharia</i> ) and the unity of the Muslim ummah.	5
KM members' enthusiasm for organizational goals	Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of KM, Member of KM	The enthusiasm of Khilafatul Muslimin members towards the organization's goals is reflected in their strong financial support, obedience to their leader, and active involvement in various activities, despite facing legal challenges.	4
KM recruitment process	Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of KM, Member of KM	The recruitment process in the Khilafatul Muslimin is open and structured, starting with dakwah safaris and religious study sessions, followed by an oath of allegiance ( <i>bai'at</i> ) that requires new members to commit to Islamic teachings, actively contribute financially ( <i>infaq</i> ), and participate in organizational activities.	3
Desire Factor Coefficient = High			4.0

The Khilafatul Muslimin's support for terrorist organizations is not demonstrated through direct acts of violence but rather through shared ideology, particularly regarding the enforcement of the *Khilafah Islamiyah*. Although Khilafatul Muslimin seeks to achieve this goal through peaceful means, they show alignment with ISIS' interpretation of implementing Islamic law. This is reflected in statements from members of Khilafatul Muslimin expressing ideological agreement with ISIS, despite not adopting the same

methods. Additionally, some members or former members of Khilafatul Muslimin have been involved in terrorism or have joined groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), and others have backgrounds in extremist groups like the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), indicating an indirect connection between Khilafatul Muslimin and terrorist actions or networks. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara). Referring to Hank Prunckun's threat analysis, data regarding the expectation factor can be converted into a threat level scale, which is then summed to determine the overall threat level. The coefficient values of the expectation factor are depicted in the following table.

Table 4. Analysis of the Expectation Factor

Components	Sources	Findings	Coefficient
Motivation of KM members to achieve organizational goals	Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Amir of KM, Member of KM	The main motivation of the Khilafatul Muslimin members is to attain Allah's approval, achieve martyrdom, and enter paradise through the struggle to establish the caliphate as a form of worship and unity for the ummah in accordance with Islamic teachings.	3
Support for terrorist groups	Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara	The support of the Khilafatul Muslimin for terrorist organizations is evident through their shared ideology about the caliphate, without direct violent actions. However, some of its members have been involved in terrorist networks such as ISIS and JAD.	4
<b>Expectation Factor Coefficient = High</b>			<b>3.5</b>

#### 4.1.3. Knowledge

The knowledge factor within the Khilafatul Muslimin can be explained through their efforts to educate their members and the general educational level of KM members. The group runs various educational programs, including religious study sessions, training (*tarbiah*), study circles (*halaqah*), and discussions to enhance faith and understanding of Islam among its members. Each region or "*kemasulan*" has a regular study schedule attended by the congregation, with a primary focus in areas such as West Sumbawa, East Lombok, Mataram, and Bima-Dompu. KM also manages a special educational institution called the Pondok Pesantren Ukhuwah Islamiyah (PPUI), which provides education from elementary to higher education levels specifically for KM members. Additionally, Islamic boarding schools named Ukhuwah Islamiyah are present in various regions, offering an educational curriculum based on KM teachings, distinct from the national curriculum. KM also utilizes social media as a means of outreach, broadening public access to the teachings they adhere to. Activities such as religious education and monthly meetings involve active participation from members in deepening their understanding of Islam and strategizing on how to spread their message. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Chief

*Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni)*

Furthermore, the general education level of KM members tends to be low, with the majority of members having an education equivalent to high school or below, and most working as farmers. Formal education up to the university level is still limited, although some members have pursued postgraduate studies to enhance their knowledge and strengthen the organization's image. KM also offers internal education through an institution called the Pondok Pesantren Ukhuwah Islamiyah (PPUI), which is not affiliated with the government. At PPUI, the education curriculum is carried out over a brief period, covering elementary through university levels within nine years. In addition to formal education, KM provides in-depth religious education through teachers (*ustadz*) from various regions to enhance members' understanding of the Qur'an and Hadith, although many members lack proficiency in Arabic or the ability to engage deeply with classical Islamic texts. (Sources: Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of KM, Member of KM).

Referring to Hank Prunckun's threat analysis, data regarding the knowledge factor can be converted into a threat level scale, which is then summed up to determine the overall threat level. The coefficient value of the knowledge factor is illustrated in the following table.

Table 5. Knowledge Factor Analysis			
Components	Sources	Findings	Coefficient
KM's education efforts for its members	Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of KM, Member of KM	The Khilafatul Muslimin runs religious education programs through regular study sessions, the PPUI educational institution, the Ukhuwah Islamiyah pesantren, as well as through discussions and outreach activities on social media to deepen the understanding of Islam for its members and the community.	3
Education level of KM residents in general	Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of KM, Member of KM	The education level of KM members is generally low, with the majority only completing high school and a small number continuing to higher education, while KM provides internal education through PPUI, which accelerates the curriculum and focuses on religious teachings.	2
<b>Knowledge Factor Coefficient = Medium</b>			<b>2.5</b>

### 4.1.3. Resource

The resource factor in the Khilafatul Muslimin can be explained through KM's financial situation and the special skills of its members. KM's financial situation is considered strong, supported by a structured internal funding system through mandatory contributions from its members in the form of *infaq* and *sadaqah*. Each member is required to donate a minimum of 5-10% of their income, with larger contributions expected from middle-class and executive members, reaching up to 30%. Fund collection takes place from the local level (*kemasulan*) to the central level (*daulah* and *khalifah*), with a portion of the

collected funds being directed to the central leadership to support KM activities. In Lampung, for example, KM can collect up to IDR 70 million per month, and they also utilize charity boxes and internal financial institutions such as Baitul Mal Abdurrahman bin Auf to strengthen their financial resources. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara)

Furthermore, KM members possess special skills that include the ability to conduct mass da'wah and physical training, both of which support the spread of their caliphate ideology. In addition to cadre training through the PPUI educational institution, KM graduates are equipped to become cadres and preachers ready to spread the caliphate doctrine. Regular physical training programs are also held for members, including sports activities, mountain climbing, and martial arts through the Persatuan Beladiri Lebah Putih (PBLP), which focuses on silat. Although PBLP is no longer directly affiliated with KM, this activity continues to attract interest, especially in areas such as Sumbawa Island, where martial arts and physical health are highly valued. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni)

Referring to Hank Prunckun's threat analysis, the data regarding the resources factor can be converted into a threat level scale, and then summed to determine the overall threat level. The coefficient values for the resources factor are illustrated in the following table 6.

## 4.2. Khilafatul Muslimin from the Threat Perspective – Kevin Riehle

To describe the threat posed by the Khilafatul Muslimin as a radical organization in Indonesia, the researcher also classifies the threat into the components of threat analysis according to Kevin Riehle. In this perspective, a threat is the result of a combination of three key factors: intent, capability, and opportunity. All three must be present for a threat to materialize. Kevin Riehle formulates the threat equation as:  $\text{threat} = \text{intent} \times \text{capability} \times \text{opportunity}$ . The data analysis shows that the Khilafatul Muslimin meets the threat factors according to Kevin Riehle: intent, capability, and opportunity. In terms of intent, they have an agenda to replace Pancasila with the system of Islamic Caliphate, which they consider a more pure and comprehensive implementation of Islam. While not directly supporting violent actions, the group shares ideological similarities with ISIS, and some of its members have been involved in terrorism, showing an indirect link to terrorist networks. In terms of capability, KM has strong financial support, the ability to raise up to IDR 70 million per month, widespread education and indoctrination, as well as trained physical and preaching skills, providing a solid foundation for their caliphate agenda. The opportunity is also utilized through their adaptation of communication technology, using platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok for preaching, reaching out to the public who may not fully understand the history and goals of KM, thus fostering sympathy.

### 4.2.1. Intent

The component of intent in the threat analysis according to Kevin Riehle consists of several factors, including the primary goals of the KM movement, support for terrorist groups, and their relationship with opposition groups to the government. The Khilafatul Muslimin has a main agenda to replace Pancasila with the system of the Islamic Caliphate, which they believe represents a comprehensive and holistic implementation of Islam. They follow the caliphate declaration and vision of uniting Muslims under *sharia*, calling all Muslims to unite under leadership based on Islamic teachings. For KM, the caliphate is not just a form of government but a congregation of the unity of the ummah that must be implemented in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet and his companions. Based on *Quran Surah Asy-Syu'ara* verse 42, they view the implementation of *sharia* as a mandate to enforce the laws of Allah in all aspects of life, unaffected by the existing national systems. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin



Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni)

Table 6. Resource Factor Analysis

Components	Sources	Findings	Coefficient
KM's financial situation	Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara	The financial situation of KM is considered strong due to the mandatory contribution system and structured fundraising efforts, which allow them to collect funds amounting to tens of millions of rupiahs per month to support the organization's activities.	4
Special skills of KM members	Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of KM, Member of KM	The members of KM possess specialized skills in preaching and physical training, including martial arts, which support the widespread dissemination of the caliphate ideology.	4
<b>Resource Factor Coefficient = High</b>			<b>4</b>

The support of the Khilafatul Muslimin for terrorist organizations is not manifested through direct acts of violence, but rather through shared ideological views, particularly regarding the enforcement of an Islamic caliphate. Although KM seeks to achieve its goals peacefully, they express support for the interpretation of Islamic law promoted by ISIS. KM shares an ideological understanding, albeit with different methods. Some of its members or former members have been involved in terrorist activities or have joined groups like Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), while others have connections to extremist groups such as NII, indicating an indirect link between KM and terrorist networks. (Sources: *Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara*)

Furthermore, the relationship between Khilafatul Muslimin and opposition groups to the government appears to be complex. While they share a common stance in opposing the government, there is no concrete evidence that KM, as an organization, has officially established ties with opposition groups. Although KM

may seek to capitalize on the dissatisfaction within opposition groups, such as labor unions, to achieve their goals, they remain staunchly anti-government and do not engage in the democratic processes in Indonesia. Experts argue that while KM and opposition groups may share the objective of opposing the government, their differing leadership and missions make formal collaboration difficult. In other words, despite the potential for exploitation, KM prefers to maintain its independent stance in opposing the government. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara)

Thus, it can be understood that the factors within the intent component in Kevin Riehle's threat analysis have been met. The Khilafatul Muslimin has an agenda to replace Pancasila with the Islamic Caliphate system, which they view as the comprehensive application of Islam, calling Muslims to unite under *sharia* in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet. Although their support for terrorist groups is not manifested through direct violent actions, KM shares ideological similarities with ISIS in enforcing *sharia*, and some of its members have been involved in terrorist acts, showing an indirect connection with terrorist networks. The relationship between KM and opposition groups to the government is also complex, where despite shared opposition to the government, there is no evidence of an official relationship between KM and opposition groups. KM prefers to remain independent in its opposition to the government without engaging in the democratic process.

#### 4.2.2. Capability

The capability component in Kevin Riehle's threat analysis consists of several factors, including KM's capacity to realize the caliphate, financial and resource readiness, and the special skills of its members. KM's capacity to establish the caliphate in Indonesia is evident from the stages of their struggle, which include congregating, listening, obedience, migration, and *jihad*, although they are currently still at the stage of obedience. The plan for migration emerged as a response to government pressure, but it has not yet materialized. With strong financial resources, KM is able to collect up to IDR 70 million per month through charity boxes and member contributions, which vary depending on social class, ranging from 5% to 30% of income. The extensive education and indoctrination activities, which start from childhood to adulthood, also provide a strong foundation for KM in their efforts to achieve their goals. With all this, although still in progress, KM shows significant potential to realize their caliphate agenda in the future. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara)

Furthermore, the financial readiness and resources of the Khilafatul Muslimin are highly impressive, with a structured and solid internal funding system. KM is able to raise up to IDR 70 million per month through charity boxes and member contributions, which vary based on social class, with a minimum contribution of 5-10% for lower-class members and up to 30% for executive members. Each member is required to deposit their *infaq* to higher levels of the organization, from local branches to the caliphate, creating a consistent flow of funds to support the organization's activities. Within its internal structure, each amir is responsible for submitting the funds collected from their members, demonstrating an organized and accountable system. With strong financial capacity and support from its members, KM shows significant readiness to continue pursuing their agenda. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara)

Furthermore, KM members possess special skills that support the spread of their caliphate ideology, including the ability to conduct mass da'wah and physical training. Through the PPUI educational institution, KM graduates are prepared to become cadres and preachers actively spreading the caliphate ideology. Additionally, KM regularly holds physical training programs that include various activities such as sports, mountain climbing, and martial arts training through the Persatuan Beladiri Lebah Putih (PBLP) organization, which focuses on silat martial arts. Although PBLP is no longer directly affiliated with KM, these activities continue to attract attention, especially in areas such as Sumbawa Island, where physical fitness and martial arts skills are highly valued. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter

*Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni)*

Thus, it can be understood that the factors within the capability component of the threat analysis according to Kevin Riehle have been fulfilled. Khilafatul Muslimin demonstrates significant capacity to realize the caliphate agenda in Indonesia through stages of struggle that include congregation, listening, obedience, migration, and *jihad*, although they are currently still in the stage of obedience. Strong financial support, with the ability to raise up to IDR 70 million per month through charity boxes and member contributions, as well as extensive education and indoctrination activities, provide a solid foundation for their efforts. In addition, KM members are equipped with special skills, including the ability to preach and regular physical training, such as sports and martial arts through the PBLP, although PBLP is no longer directly affiliated with KM. All these factors demonstrate KM's readiness and potential to continue their struggle in achieving the caliphate goal in the future.

### 4.2.3. Opportunity

The opportunity component in the threat analysis according to Kevin Riehle consists of several factors, including the public's reaction to the presence of KM and KM's adaptation to communication technology. The public's reaction to the existence of KM varies depending on individual knowledge and experience with the group. Some members of the public, who are unaware of KM's history, tend to sympathize with their preaching movement, viewing it as a positive endeavor. However, those who are more familiar with KM's background are more likely to oppose or resist the movement. In regions like West Sumbawa, the public is aware of KM but does not perceive it as a threat, as long as the group does not cause disruption and remains aligned with the existing beliefs. This stance has remained consistent even after the arrest of Ustadz Abdul Qadir Hasan Baraja, with the public continuing to accept KM's presence without significant conflict. Meanwhile, in Lombok, the public's indifference to KM is reflected in the reduced participation in kemasulan, with some KM members still maintaining kinship ties but preferring to form separate communities. Overall, the public's reaction shows ambivalence, ranging from acceptance, rejection, or indifference to KM's existence, depending on the social context and the knowledge available. (Sources: Director of Prevention of National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia, Head of the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center University of Indonesia, Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara)

Furthermore, the Khilafatul Muslimin has shown significant adaptation to communication technology, particularly through the use of social media to conduct da'wah and spread their ideology. They regularly hold study sessions, including on online platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, although after the arrest of their *Khalifah*, the use of social media shifted more toward personal initiatives rather than official group activities. KM members utilize social media to share information about their activities, such as religious studies (*ta'lim*) and religious celebrations, as well as to conduct live sermons on platforms like Facebook Live and TikTok Live. This reflects their understanding of the importance of communication technology in expanding the reach of their da'wah efforts and educating the public, while also maintaining their group identity amid existing challenges. (Sources: Chief Operational Officer of State Intelligence Agency Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Vice Director of Intelligence and Security at Police Regional West Nusa Tenggara, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni)

Thus, it can be understood that the factors within the opportunity component of the threat analysis according to Kevin Riehle have been met. The public's reaction to the presence of Khilafatul Muslimin varies depending on individuals' knowledge and experience with the group. Those who are less familiar with KM's history tend to sympathize with the movement, viewing their da'wah efforts positively, while those with a better understanding are more likely to reject or oppose it. In West Sumbawa, even though the community recognizes KM, they do not perceive it as a threat as long as it does not disturb the existing beliefs, even after the arrest of Ustadz Abdul Qadir Hasan Baraja. On the other hand, in Lombok, there is indifference shown by a reduction in participation in the group, with some members maintaining familial connections but choosing to form separate communities. Overall, this reflects the ambivalence of the public, between

acceptance, rejection, or indifference toward KM. On the other hand, KM has also shown significant adaptation to communication technology by utilizing social media for da'wah activities. They regularly hold study sessions on platforms like Facebook and YouTube, as well as conduct live lectures via Facebook Live and TikTok, reflecting their understanding of the importance of technology in expanding the reach of their da'wah and maintaining the group's identity.

### **4.3. Khilafatul Muslimin from the Terrorist Mindset Perspective - Randy Borum**

To describe the phenomenon of the Khilafatul Muslimin as a radical organization in Indonesia, the researcher also uses the perspective of the Terrorist Mindset by Randy Borum. In this perspective, there are four stages in the development process of extremist or radical ideology including context, comparison, attribution, and reaction.

#### **4.3.1. Context**

At the context stage, the Khilafatul Muslimin views the current social condition of Muslims as chaotic and far from the true values of Islam, where the ummah is divided into various factions and influenced by political and economic systems they consider to be flawed, such as democracy. According to them, this chaos is the result of pure Islamic teachings being mixed with non-Islamic political interests, causing the ummah to lose direction and become indifferent to Islamic law (*sharia*). KM also sees the internal division within the Muslim community as the main obstacle to achieving the caliphate, a system that they believe would unite the ummah under Allah's *sharia* and restore the role of the ummah as the *khalifah* on earth. (Sources: Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni)

Thus, the Khilafatul Muslimin views the current social condition of Muslims as a "false" state, deviating from the teachings of pure Islam. They believe that the Muslim community has become fragmented into various factions, leading to disputes among them and weakening the unity of the ummah. According to KM, the democratic system currently adopted is also seen as the main cause of social complexity and injustice, as they believe this system is incompatible with Islamic law (*sharia*) and actually distances the ummah from the role of the *khalifah* they should embody. For KM, only by uniting under the caliphate and abandoning systems and external influences they consider wrong, can Muslims achieve prosperity and full adherence to Islamic teachings.

#### **4.3.2. Comparison**

At this stage, the Khilafatul Muslimin feels that the current condition of Muslims is not only concerning but also unjust, especially in the implementation of a governing system that they believe favors certain groups over Muslims. KM perceives this injustice as the disregard for the idea of the caliphate, which they view as the ideal system that once brought Islam to greatness for 13 centuries. They compare the freedom that other religious groups have in practicing their teachings with the lack of freedom Muslims have to implement the caliphate system, making them feel that Islam is not given the same space by the government. Referring to the past glory under the caliphate and the ongoing conflicts in the divided Muslim countries, KM concludes that only through unity under one Islamic leadership can the ummah be freed from this injustice, while the current system only harms and weakens them as a unified entity. (Sources: Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong, Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik, Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni)

Thus, the Khilafatul Muslimin transforms their dissatisfaction with the current social and political system into the belief that they are being treated unjustly because the system of caliphate is not given equal space alongside other ideologies in practicing religious life. They feel accused and marginalized, even though they believe that the caliphate represents a historic and legitimate form of Islamic unity that once brought glory to the Muslim community for centuries. KM views this injustice as not only harmful to their group but to the entire Muslim ummah, as it disregards the Islamic system they believe could bring stability and progress, similar to the times of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the early *Khalifah*. By believing that unity under the caliphate is the only way for the ummah to rise from division and helplessness, this

perception of injustice becomes the foundation for justifying the need for radical change and criticism of a system they see as detrimental to Islam.

### 4.3.3. Contribution

At this stage, KM sees the government as the party responsible for the injustice they perceive, especially in terms of the freedom to practice the teachings of the caliphate and the unequal treatment they believe they receive. They believe that the government prioritizes certain groups and often neglects the 1945 Constitution in terms of religious justice, while other groups, such as Christians, are granted full freedom to practice their teachings. KM also views the abuse of power through government actions, such as the arrest of their leader for alleged violations, as actions that should not be within the government's authority. They also highlight the seizure of collected funds from their followers, as well as corruption, which they believe further demonstrates the government's injustice toward Muslims. This perspective drives KM to perceive the government's actions as forms of injustice that not only harm them but also the entire Muslim ummah. (Sources: *Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong*, *Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik*, *Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni*)

Thus, the Khilafatul Muslimin views the government as responsible for the injustice they experience, believing that the government disproportionately restricts certain Islamic teachings and does not provide equal treatment compared to other religious groups. They see actions such as the arrest of their leaders, the seizure of congregation funds, and the obstruction of caliphate teachings as evidence that the government favors certain factions and abuses its power to control religious practices that they believe are in accordance with the constitution and the 1945 Constitution. This dissatisfaction is further reinforced by the perception that the government has strayed from its role as a neutral mediator and instead serves the interests of its own faction. This viewpoint leads KM members to feel that they are being treated unfairly, which could form the basis for more aggressive actions or resistance in their efforts to fight for their rights and to rebuild a system they believe is more just, in line with the Islamic values they uphold.

### 4.3.4. Reaction

At the reaction stage, there are two possible reactions that can occur: "generalizing/stereotyping" or "dehumanizing/demonizing the enemy." In this case, the Khilafatul Muslimin applies negative labels to those they see as opposing the concept of caliphate, believing that ideologies such as democracy, capitalism, and communism are foreign influences that erode Islamic values and cause division within the Muslim community. According to them, groups or individuals who support these systems are seen as being influenced by the "*kafir*" (non-believers) and contributing to the destruction of the Muslim ummah, which can only be resolved through unity under the caliphate. This perspective emphasizes that Muslims who are not united under the caliphate system are viewed as deviating from true Islam and as the cause of the current weakness of Islam. Believing that the only path to Islamic prosperity is through a unified caliphate system, they view any division as a flaw that undermines the teachings and future of the Muslim community. (Sources: *Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Ummul Quro Selong*, *Amir of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Kekalik*, *Member of Khilafatul Muslimin Kemasulan Seruni*)

In the end, the Khilafatul Muslimin chooses to react by "generalizing/stereotyping" because the group appears to adopt an exclusive stance, judging that the government and the systems it supports, such as democracy, are negative influences rooted in "*kafir*" values and incompatible with the Islamic teachings they follow. KM tends to view all parties affiliated with the government as homogenous opponents of the concept of the caliphate and as part of an external influence that undermines the unity of Islam. Believing that only the caliphate system can bring about the glory of Islam, they disregard the complexity and diversity of individuals in the government or society who may hold differing perspectives on religion and state. This all-encompassing view reinforces KM's exclusivity, as if only people within the Khilafatul Muslimin possess true loyalty to the correct Islamic values, while those outside the group are seen as the main cause of the division within the Muslim community.

## 5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this study highlights the important role of social media in modern counter-terrorism efforts, particularly for Densus 88 in Indonesia. Platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube

are vital for gathering real-time intelligence, monitoring threats, and identifying terrorist networks. By using both active and passive surveillance methods, Densus 88 can respond more effectively to emerging threats, employing data mining and Social Network Analysis (SNA) to reveal suspicious activities and connections within these networks. The findings show that when used properly, social media tools help law enforcement agencies like Densus 88 map out communication among terrorist groups, providing crucial insights to prevent attacks. Techniques like SNA, classification, clustering, and sentiment analysis enable the processing of large amounts of data, allowing for the identification of high-risk individuals and radicalized groups. This helps Densus 88 track extremist ideologies and respond quickly to potential violence.

However, the study also points out significant challenges, particularly regarding ethical concerns about balancing security and individual privacy. The vast amounts of personal data shared on social media raise issues about surveillance overreach and civil liberties. The study emphasizes the need for strong ethical guidelines and transparent policies to ensure the responsible use of social media for intelligence gathering. Furthermore, while technological tools are essential, their effectiveness improves when combined with human intelligence. Manual monitoring and human judgment are crucial for understanding the context of information and distinguishing real threats from harmless content. This combination is vital for accurate threat detection and reducing false positives.

Overall, the study enhances our understanding of how social media can be used in counter-terrorism. It highlights the strengths and limitations of digital tools available to law enforcement and stresses the need for ongoing improvements in technology and policy. Collaboration between government agencies and social media platforms will be key to addressing terrorism in the digital age. As terrorism evolves, strategies must adapt to maintain a balance between security and privacy. The insights from this study are not only relevant for Densus 88 but also offer valuable lessons for other countries and organizations involved in counter-terrorism. Continuous refinement of technology and ethics in intelligence gathering is essential for enhancing the effectiveness of global counter-terrorism strategies.

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