

Strategic Intelligence and Human Security: An Evaluative Analysis of BPOM's Strategy Against Illegal Trihexyphenidyl Circulation in Indonesia

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Article Info

Received: 08-June-2026

Revised: 01-Sept-2026

Accepted: 05-Sept-2026

Keywords

Early Detection; Early Warning;
Human Security; Illegal
Trihexyphenidyl; Rational Choice
Theory; Strategic Intelligence

Abstract

The unauthorized circulation and non-medical consumption of illegal Trihexyphenidyl (THD)—a prescription anticholinergic agent—have escalated into a multi-dimensional threat directly undermining human security, public health, and social stability within Indonesia. This study aims to structurally analyze the socio-legal mechanics of illegal Trihexyphenidyl trafficking and evaluate the operational strategies executed by the Directorate of Drug and Food Intelligence of the Indonesian Food and Drug Authority (BPOM). Adopting a post-positivist qualitative descriptive framework, primary data was collected through extensive, semi-structured interviews with eight high-level informants across the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), BPOM's intelligence and enforcement directorates, the National Narcotics Board (BNN), the Ministry of Health, medical toxicologists, and criminologists, complemented by field observations of underground retail nodes. Data processing utilized thematic triangulation synthesized with the standardized framework of the Intelligence Cycle. The results indicate that the market expansion of illegal Trihexyphenidyl operates as a classic "rational choice" mechanism, where the intersection of low economic cost (Rp1,500–Rp2,000 per tablet), pseudo-narcotic euphoric output, easy online-offline access, and a statutory legal vacuum for consumption under Law No. 17 of 2023 on Health creates an optimization model for illicit syndicates. The study demonstrates that while BPOM has successfully integrated early detection and warning protocols via cyber crawls and inter-agency collaboration, significant friction persists within the "Means" domain due to statutory limitations restricting BPOM's access to wiretapping and tactical signal triangulation equipment (Direct Finder) under Permen Kominfo No. 9 of 2018. The paper concludes by presenting a strategic blueprint using the Lykke Model, highlighting the necessity of an AI-driven, NLP-equipped cyber crawling engine, joint special operational taskforces (Satgassus), and immediate legislative revisions to secure national human resilience.

1. Introduction

The systemic proliferation of illegal prescription medication networks has transformed into a critical structural challenge threatening global public health and non-traditional national security architectures. Within the domestic landscape of Indonesia, the unauthorized distribution and recreationally driven consumption of Specified Medications (Obat-Obat Tertentu or OOT)—drugs that actively affect the central nervous system (CNS) without falling strictly under statutory classification as narcotics or psychotropics—have emerged as an acute epidemic among vulnerable adolescent and young adult demographics. Under

the regulatory definition set by the Indonesian Food and Drug Authority (BPOM) Regulation No. 10 of 2019 and Regulation No. 12 of 2025, Specified Medications comprise substances like Tramadol, Trihexyphenidyl, Chlorpromazine, Amitriptyline, Haloperidol, and Dextromethorphan, all of which exhibit high potentials for chemical dependency, acute behavioral alteration, and permanent cognitive degradation when ingested beyond clinical thresholds.

Among these substances, Trihexyphenidyl (THD), commercially known under trade names such as Hexymer and Arkine, has become the primary commodity of the underground pharmaceutical market. Originally designed as a legitimate prescription antikolinergik agent to control parkinsonian extrapyramidal symptoms and neuroleptic-induced movement disorders, Trihexyphenidyl works by binding and blocking central muscarinic acetylcholine receptors, effectively restoring dopamine balances within the corpus striatum. However, when dislodged from clinical parameters and abused in massive quantities, Trihexyphenidyl generates intense euphoric states, sensory hallucinations, and an artificial sense of emotional numbness and physical courage. The physical fallout from chronic consumption is severe: acute physiological responses range from severe xerostomia, blurred vision, tachycardia, and respiratory depression to persistent delirium, toxic psychosis, and irreversible cognitive decline. Critically, because the active metabolites are filtered through the renal system, prolonged high-dose consumption triggers severe corporate nephrotoxicity, accelerating chronic kidney failure. This dynamic places an immense structural burden on state resources, as renal diseases consistently rank among the highest financial claim categories within Indonesia's national healthcare insurance program (BPJS Kesehatan).

The scale of this illicit network is underscored by several massive seizures recorded by BPOM and its regional branches (UPT). For instance, on June 29, 2021, the Regional Office for Drug and Food Control (BBPOM) in Mataram intercepted 150,000 illegal Trihexyphenidyl tablets. This was followed on October 2, 2024, by a major enforcement action by BBPOM Serang, resulting in the confiscation of 2,729,500 tablets. The largest structural disruption occurred on March 25, 2024, when BPOM orchestrated a simultaneous raid on three industrial-scale underground warehouses in Semarang, uncovering over 500,000,000 illegal Trihexyphenidyl pills packaged and ready for national distribution. These numbers prove that illegal Trihexyphenidyl trafficking is no longer a localized petty infraction; it is an organized, industrial-scale criminal enterprise exploiting systemic vulnerabilities in supply chains and regulatory frameworks.

Sociologically, the mass distribution of illegal Trihexyphenidyl has acted as a catalyst for a distinct wave of youth violence and urban criminality across Indonesian metropolises. Empirical security records link the widespread consumption of these cheap pills to the rise of violent adolescent street gangs, notably the notorious "Klitih" phenomenon in Yogyakarta—where groups of teenagers engage in random, unprovoked machete attacks on public streets—as well as violent inter-school brawls (*tawuran*) and predatory motorcycle gang activities in Jakarta. The drug acts as a psychological amplifier, stripping away fear and empathy while significantly escalating impulsive, aggressive behavior. Consequently, the unchecked expansion of this black market threatens the core quality of the nation's human capital, jeopardizing Indonesia's long-term strategic timeline for the "Visi Indonesia Emas 2045" blueprint, which depends entirely on securing a highly productive, healthy generation of youth.

To combat this evolving threat, the state established the Directorate of Drug and Food Intelligence within BPOM under Presidential Regulation No. 80 of 2017, operating within Deputy IV for Enforcement. This specialized branch is mandated to run tactical and strategic operations to neutralize health-sector threats before they manifest as broad public crises. However, standard administrative auditing and reactive policing methods have proven obsolete against today's fluid, tech-driven criminal syndicates. These networks utilize a sophisticated Hybrid Distribution Model, blending encrypted digital communication with decentralized physical logistics. While existing academic literature frequently addresses the clinical or administrative aspects of drug control, there is a clear gap regarding the strategic intelligence methodologies required to counter these networks. Therefore, this study evaluates the specific threat anatomy of illegal Trihexyphenidyl circulation and conducts an evaluative analysis of the intelligence strategies applied by BPOM to safeguard national economic, social, and human security architectures.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Strategic Intelligence Framework (Sherman Kent)

To analyze the systemic countermeasure operations of BPOM, this study relies on Sherman Kent's foundational conceptualization of Strategic Intelligence as articulated in *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (1949). Kent views intelligence through three separate but connected dimensions: as Knowledge, as an Organization, and as an Activity. Intelligence as Knowledge means providing highly specialized, verified, and parsed information that allows state leaders to protect national interests and counter institutional vulnerabilities. Intelligence as an Organization focuses on the institutional frameworks, personnel structures, and security protocols needed to process information and coordinate actions efficiently. Intelligence as an Activity represents the continuous cycle of planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Applied to this study, Kent's framework helps evaluate how BPOM structures its information collection, coordinates institutional networks, and turns raw data into actionable enforcement strategies to disrupt illegal drug distribution channels.

2.2. Securitization Theory and the Non-Traditional Security Matrix (Barry Buzan)

Because illegal drug distribution functions without conventional military components, its evaluation requires Barry Buzan's non-traditional security matrix. Buzan's *People, States and Fear* (1991) expands state security into five sectors: Military, Political, Economic, Societal, and Environmental. Illegal Trihexyphenidyl trafficking begins as an economic and health vulnerability but quickly triggers systemic damage across the societal and political sectors, weakening social cohesion and undermining institutional authority. Furthermore, this study applies the Securitization framework developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), which tracks how a public issue is elevated to a critical security priority through a specific "Speech Act" by state authorities. Once accepted by the target audience, this process legitimizes the use of "Extraordinary Measures"—special, non-procedural interventions outside normal administrative boundaries—to eliminate the identified threat.

2.3. Rational Choice Theory (Gary Becker)

Understanding the microeconomic drivers of both drug abuse and criminal supply networks requires Gary S. Becker's Rational Choice Theory (1974). Becker argues that illegal acts are calculated economic decisions rather than simple moral failures. An individual chooses to violate the law if the expected utility or profit outweighs the potential risks and penal costs. This framework explains how illicit syndicates exploit massive price differences between expensive narcotics and cheap, easily accessible prescription pills, while maximizing profits through low legal exposure and soft statutory penalties.

2.4. The Strategic Balance Model (Arthur Lykke)

Evaluating the long-term effectiveness of BPOM's operations requires Arthur F. Lykke Jr.'s Strategic Balance Model (1989). Lykke views strategy as an equation balancing three essential components: Ends (the clear goals), Ways (the methods and operational concepts used), and Means (the resources, tools, and authority allocated). A successful strategy requires structural balance among all three components. If the requested goals (Ends) or operational methods (Ways) are too large for the allocated resources and legal powers (Means), the strategy experiences internal friction, resulting in strategic risk and operational gaps.

3. Method

This study uses a qualitative descriptive design based on a post-positivist paradigm, which is ideal for evaluating hidden, fast-evolving criminal networks in the health sector. The research focus targets the intersection of state intelligence, public health law, and enforcement mechanics within Indonesia's pharmaceutical monitoring system. Primary data was gathered over a multi-month field period from June to November 2025 through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a purposively selected group of eight

key informants. This sample was constructed based on Patton's Purposive Sampling framework (2002) to ensure high expertise and direct exposure to the problem:

- Informant BIN-1: Director of Economy, Deputy IV (Economic Intelligence), State Intelligence Agency.
- Informant BPOM-1: Director of Drug and Food Intelligence, BPOM.
- Informant BPOM-3: Director of Drug and Food Investigation, BPOM.
- Informants BPOM-2, BPOM-4, BPOM-5: Senior Intelligence Analysts and Functional Officers within the Directorates of Intelligence and Preventative Surveillance (Cegah Tangkal), BPOM.
- Informant BNN-1: Senior Enforcement Officer, National Narcotics Board.
- Informant KS-1: Director of Pharmaceutical Production and Distribution, Ministry of Health.
- Informants DR-1 & AK-1: Medical Toxicologist and Academic Criminologist specializing in pharmaceutical crimes and social deviance.

The primary testimonies were cross-verified with field data collected via direct, non-participatory observations of active illegal retail distribution points, specifically disguised cosmetics shops within the Jakarta metropolitan area. Secondary data inputs included BPOM's annual enforcement ledgers, digital siber patrol registers, and historical prosecution records. Data analysis followed John W. Creswell's qualitative data lifecycle (2018), which moves through structural transcription, general immersion, initial open coding, axial category mapping, and final selective thematic aggregation. The reliability and validity of the processed data were checked against Lincoln and Guba's strict trustworthiness criteria (1985), applying detailed source triangulation, method triangulation (comparing interview outputs against corporate files and court cases), and formal member checking with key informants to remove analytical bias.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Anatomy of Illegal Trihexyphenidyl Circulation in Indonesia

The empirical findings reveal that the trafficking network for illegal Trihexyphenidyl in Indonesia has evolved into an organized, highly adaptive criminal ecosystem that coordinates offline retail setups with digital black markets. To trace the physical movement of these illicit products across the country, this study analyzed intelligence tracking data generated by Aviation Security (AVSEC) teams at Indonesia's key transport hubs—Halim Perdanakusuma International Airport and Soekarno-Hatta International Airport—which routinely share interception logs with the Directorate of Drug and Food Intelligence of BPOM. This distribution data is detailed below.

Table 1. Logs of AVSEC Teams

Year	Total Interception Alerts	Volume of Intercepted Tablets	Primary Provincial Destinations
2022	255	460,744	West Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), Central Kalimantan, Bali
2023	530	1,161,062	South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan
2024	296	633,390	South Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Bangka Belitung, South Kalimantan
Total	1,081	2,255,196	Central and Eastern Indonesia Expansion Centers

This air log data highlights a major shift in trafficking operations: illicit networks are increasingly moving beyond their historical bases in Java to expand deep into Central and Eastern Indonesia, targeting regions like Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). Traffickers deliberately utilize domestic air freight networks because they can move massive volumes of pills quickly while exploiting weaker inspection protocols at regional logistics hubs. Field data confirms that nearly all of these air shipments are driven by digital transactions arranged on online marketplaces.

To analyze the digital side of this trade, this study evaluated the records of the Directorate of Cyber Surveillance of Drug and Food at BPOM. Between 2022 and 2024, BPOM's automated web-crawling systems identified 5,693 active illicit storefront URLs: 3,346 URLs in 2022, 1,541 in 2023, and 806 in 2024. While these numbers seem to show a downward trend, intelligence analysts (BPOM-2) warn that this decrease is misleading. Instead of stopping operations, syndicates are using advanced evasion techniques to bypass automated detection algorithms. Traffickers systematically alter standard keywords, replacing "Trihexyphenidyl" with coded e-commerce terms like "THP," "Putih" (White), or "Kuning" (Yellow), and embedding these text strings directly into product display images rather than searchable text fields. This visual manipulation prevents standard text-based web crawlers from flagging the listings, keeping the storefronts accessible to buyers who know the codes.

On the ground, these digital networks connect with covert physical retail hubs. Field observations in East Jakarta documented illegal distribution networks disguised as legitimate cosmetics or beauty supply shops. These operations use a highly uniform set of security protocols: they operate out of dense residential or commercial zones with their metal rolling shutters kept precisely half-open to obscure inside activities from passerby. These shops do not display the pills openly and only serve verified local customers or individuals using specific verbal codes. Transactions are completed within seconds with no receipt trail, and the stock is stored in hidden back rooms, allowing the setup to blend smoothly into the local retail environment.

4.2. Multi-Sectoral Threats: Application of Securitization and Rational Choice Models

Applying Barry Buzan's framework reveals that illegal Trihexyphenidyl trafficking is a non-traditional security threat with severe, cascading impacts across multiple sectors. Rather than remaining a isolated regulatory challenge, it directly compromises human security across two core dimensions: health security and community security. In the health security arena, testimonies from toxicologists (DR-1) and enforcement experts highlight acute nervous system damage and behavioral dependencies among users. Economically, the spike in young patients suffering from renal failure caused by chronic pill abuse places a heavy financial drain on the national insurance system (BPJS Kesehatan), redirecting critical funds away from wider development projects. Societally, the trade damages community safety by fueling the violent street gangs and mass student brawls that threaten urban stability.

To track how this issue moved from a standard public health concern to a national security priority, this study maps the process using Buzan's Securitization Model, which tracks the transition across three essential stages: Speech Acts, Referent Objects, and Extraordinary Measures. This matrix is detailed below.

Table 2. The Matrix of Buzan's Securitization Model

Securitization Component	Institutional Mechanics and Declarations	Analytical Focus and Impact
Speech Act	Presidential launch of the National Action Plan for Eradicating Illegal Drugs (October 3, 2017) and the launch of the National Movement on Alert for Illegal Drugs and Food (GN-WOMI). High-level Ministerial coordination sessions led by the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (PMK).	Formally elevates pharmaceutical crime from a basic administrative violation to an active, multidimensional threat to national human capital.
Referent Object	The collective health, cognitive capability, and productive capacity of Indonesian youth (ages 16–30).	Identifies the nation's youth generation as the core asset being degraded by syndicates, making

Securitization Component	Institutional Mechanics and Declarations	Analytical Focus and Impact
Extraordinary Measures	Safeguarding the strategic foundation required to achieve the "Visi Indonesia Emas 2045" goals.	their protection essential for state survival.
	Enactment of BPOM Regulation No. 12 of 2025 on Specified Medications. Simultaneous joint enforcement raids uniting BPOM, BIN, BNN, and POLRI Special Units to dismantle industrial hubs. Multi-agency cyber takedown operations with Komdigi.	Bypasses standard bureaucratic protocols to deploy intelligence-driven, multi-agency tactical operations to disrupt the trade's supply lines.

This securitization analysis proves that the state has successfully framed illegal Trihexyphenidyl trafficking as an active threat to national stability. However, despite these efforts, the market continues to expand because of powerful microeconomic drivers that match Gary Becker's Rational Choice Theory. An evaluation of the market's cost-benefit dynamics reveals that users and dealers act as rational economic agents who choose to participate because the benefits outweigh the risks. This economic relationship is detailed below:

Table 3. The Economics Relationship

Market Actor	Perceived Benefits and Utility	Perceived Risks and Enforcement Costs
Consumer/User (Adolescents & Gangs)	Extremely low cost (Rp1,500–Rp2,000 per pill, or Rp15,000 per strip) fits constrained student budgets. Yields powerful euphoric and pseudo-narcotic states comparable to expensive illicit drugs.	Zero legal risk. Law No. 17 of 2023 on Health contains zero criminal penalties for buyers or end consumers of illegal prescription pills, creating a legal vacuum.
Trafficker/Dealer (Syndicates & Retailers)	Massive profit margins due to cheap production costs. A single retail store averages a minimum daily revenue of Rp600,000, which surges significantly over weekends.	Low legal consequences. BPOM prosecution records (2022–2024) show that judges rarely impose the maximum sentences under the Health Law, with courts typically handing down sentences of just 1 to 2 years.

This rational choice analysis reveals the root cause of the market's resilience: the current socio-legal framework creates a low-risk, high-reward environment. For users, Trihexyphenidyl functions as a risk-free alternative to narcotics, offering a similar high without the danger of arrest. For dealers, the massive financial returns easily outweigh the short prison terms handed down by courts. This legal imbalance creates a persistent challenge for enforcement teams working to disrupt the trade.

4.3. Strategic Evaluation of BPOM's Countermeasures (Ends, Ways, Means)

To analyze the overall effectiveness of BPOM's response to this illicit market, this study uses Arthur Lykke's Strategic Balance Model, which evaluates how well an organization aligns its core goals (Ends), operational concepts (Ways), and resources (Means). This structural balance analysis is detailed below.

Table 4. Structural Balance Analysis

Strategic Pillar	Core Components and Implementation Actions	Operational Status and Gaps
Ends (Strategic Goals)	Protecting human and health security by securing Indonesia's youth from illegal pill abuse. Dismantling the supply networks of illicit syndicates to re-establish regulatory control over prescription drug distribution.	Clear and aligned with national security priorities. Successfully positions drug control within the country's long-term human capital strategy.

Strategic Pillar	Core Components and Implementation Actions	Operational Status and Gaps
Ways (Operational Methods)	Deploying advanced cyber monitoring and data-matching protocols. Cultivating collaborative intelligence-sharing networks uniting BPOM, BNN, BIN, and local transport authorities (AVSEC). Initiating proactive joint enforcement operations against manufacturing hubs.	Highly adaptive but structurally limited. Operational methods face constant friction when trying to convert intelligence insights into formal criminal prosecutions. Critical Strategic Deficit. BPOM lacks independent
Means (Resources & Authority)	Statutory enforcement powers under Law No. 17 of 2023 on Health. Automated digital crawling systems and a dedicated cadre of civil service investigators (PPNS). Inter-agency data sharing channels.	authority to perform wiretapping or utilize specialized mobile tracking equipment (Direct Finder), creating a major operational gap.

This strategic balance evaluation reveals a severe systemic vulnerability within BPOM's operational framework: a deep mismatch between its ambitious goals (Ends) and its actual enforcement powers (Means). While the Directorate of Drug and Food Intelligence has built modern data-sharing channels and advanced surveillance models, its teams are legally blocked from using essential intelligence tools. Under Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Komdigi) Regulation No. 9 of 2018, the use of tactical signal triangulation technology—such as Direct Finder (DF) tracking units—is strictly restricted to military and central state intelligence institutions. Because BPOM is excluded from this regulation, its field teams cannot independently track the mobile signals of hidden traffickers or intercept phone networks during active distribution runs.

This statutory gap forces BPOM into a position of institutional dependency, making it reliant on joint operations with external bodies like BIN, BNN, or the police to execute deep surveillance runs. When these partner institutions are managing competing national security priorities, the processing of drug intelligence is often slowed down. This structural friction breaks the continuity of the intelligence cycle, preventing BPOM from independently running rapid, tech-driven operations against sophisticated syndicates. To minimize this risk, BPOM must transition to a collaborative governance model, using formal joint operation frameworks to access these critical tools while working to secure independent statutory intelligence powers.

4.4. Integration of the Intelligence Cycle in Counter-Trafficking Operations

To bypass these structural limits and optimize its enforcement run, the Directorate of Drug and Food Intelligence organizes its workflows around the four core stages of the structured Intelligence Cycle: Judgment, Forecasting, Early Warning, and Problem Solving. This integrated operational approach is detailed below:

1. **Judgment (Early Detection Phase):** In this opening phase, intelligence analysts conduct data-matching sweeps across internal and external inputs to identify active market risks. Analysts track anomalies such as a sudden drop in a licensed pharmacy's reported earnings paired with massive wholesale orders of raw chemicals, or flags from AVSEC transport logs showing unusual cargo movements. This stage also leverages community inputs to uncover covert retail networks, such as cosmetics shops operating with half-closed shutters. By combining these diverse data sources, BPOM can accurately spot hidden distribution nodes and map out illicit supply lines before they expand into wider public crises.
2. **Forecasting (Trend Projection Phase):** This predictive stage focuses on analyzing market data to anticipate how syndicates will adjust their tactics. Current intelligence models indicate that as BPOM increases its surveillance over standard e-commerce platforms, traffickers are moving their operations onto private, encrypted messaging channels, hidden dark web forums, and in-game communication networks within popular online video games. Additionally, forecasting

assessments warn that traffickers are increasingly targeting rural school districts and industrial construction sites, where thin local policing and high economic stress create highly vulnerable consumer bases. This foresight allows BPOM to adjust its enforcement posture before syndicates can exploit these new markets.

3. **Early Warning (Strategic Alert Phase):** This phase transforms analytical insights into actionable threat alerts for policymakers and enforcement leaders. These alerts are organized into three distinct operational levels to ensure the right teams can respond immediately:
 - a. **Strategic Alerts:** High-level threat assessments delivered directly to the executive leadership of BPOM, the Ministry of Health, and BIN, detailing long-term shifts in national drug flows and recommending legislative updates.
 - b. **Tactical Alerts:** Actionable intelligence profiles sent directly to regional enforcement units, detailing specific target companies, mapping their hidden networks, and estimating illicit shipment volumes.
 - c. **Operative Alerts:** Real-time emergency notifications sent directly to field teams, detailing intercept targets, tracking specific delivery vehicles, or flagging active online store fronts for immediate takedown.
4. **Problem Solving (Strategic Intervention Phase):** In this final stage, the organization turns its intelligence insights into structural solutions designed to disrupt the illicit trade permanently. Operations focus on executing precision, intelligence-driven raids to dismantle underground factories and secure criminal convictions against syndicate leaders, moving past simple street-level drug busts. Structurally, problem-solving teams deploy AI-powered web crawlers equipped with Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to automatically identify and take down storefronts using coded text or altered product images. On the social side, BPOM works with schools and community leaders to run targeted educational campaigns, directly undermining the market's demand side by lifting public literacy on the severe health risks of prescription drug abuse.

5. Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1. Conclusion

The unauthorized distribution and recreational consumption of illegal Trihexyphenidyl in Indonesia represents a critical non-traditional threat that undermines national human security, weakens urban stability, and damages public health. Driven by powerful microeconomic realities, both users and syndicates operate on highly calculated rational choices, exploiting the low production costs of these pills, their powerful psychoactive effects, and a major statutory legal vacuum that contains zero criminal penalties for end consumers under current health legislation. While the Directorate of Drug and Food Intelligence of BPOM has built modern cyber surveillance channels and effective inter-agency networks, its operations face significant structural friction within the "Means" domain. Due to outdated regulations like Permen Kominfo No. 9 of 2018, BPOM is legally blocked from independently using wiretapping tools and tactical signal triangulation equipment, leaving it dependent on external institutions and slowing down enforcement runs. To overcome these limits, the state must modernize BPOM's legal authority, deploy advanced digital monitoring tools, and build tighter multi-agency enforcement taskforces to dismantle these illicit syndicates permanently.

5.2. Recommendation

5.2.1. Legislative and Policy Reforms

The Government of Indonesia must initiate an immediate statutory revision of Law No. 17 of 2023 on Health to introduce clear criminal penalties for individuals who possess, distribute, or consume Specified Medications (OOT) outside authorized medical prescriptions, effectively closing the current legal vacuum

exploited by users. Crucially, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics must update Permen Kominfo No. 9 of 2018 to formally grant BPOM's intelligence directorate the legal authority to operate signal triangulation systems (Direct Finder) and independent wiretapping tools during active criminal investigations, removing the organization's institutional dependency on outside agencies.

5.2.2. Technological and Infrastructure Upgrades

BPOM must invest in upgrading its digital surveillance capabilities by building an advanced cyber crawling engine equipped with Artificial Intelligence (AI), Natural Language Processing (NLP), and Optical Character Recognition (OCR). This system must be trained to automatically identify and flag illicit storefronts that hide behind coded terminology, shortened keywords like "THP," or text embedded inside product display images. Concurrently, BPOM must establish a unified, real-time national Big Data clearinghouse that integrates transaction tracking data across BPOM, BIN, BNN, POLRI, and customs, allowing field teams to instantly spot cross-border smuggling anomalies.

5.2.3. Inter-Agency and Field Enforcement Operations

The state should establish a permanent, multi-agency Specialized Counter-Trafficking Taskforce (Satgassus), uniting dedicated personnel from BPOM, BIN, BNN, and the national police under a single command structure. This taskforce must focus on running intelligence-driven operations to dismantle industrial-scale manufacturing hubs and hidden logistics networks, moving away from simple reactive policing. On the ground, regional offices must cooperate with local governments to run strict, unannounced inspections of independent cosmetics stores, pharmacy outlets, and shipping nodes within high-risk zones.

5.2.4. Educational and Social Preventative Frameworks

BPOM must partner with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology to build formal educational modules detailing the severe toxicological dangers of prescription pill abuse, embedding these programs directly into national secondary school curricula. Furthermore, regional branches should fund community-led surveillance programs that empower parents, teachers, and local youth groups to identify early warning signs of drug activity, systematically dropping local demand through increased health literacy and collective social control.

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