

The Dissolution of Jamaah Islamiyah as Collective Deradicalisation and Its Implications for Indonesia's National Security

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Abstract

The declaration of Jamaah Islamiyah's dissolution on 30 June 2024 marked an important turning point in Indonesia's counterterrorism landscape. This article analyses the impact of the dissolution on the continuity of former Jamaah Islamiyah members' activities and its implications for Indonesia's national security. This study uses a qualitative approach based on in-depth interviews with former Jamaah Islamiyah members, law enforcement and intelligence officials, and academics, supported by indirect observation and document studies. The analysis is conducted through data condensation, data display, conclusion drawing, verification, and triangulation. The findings show that Jamaah Islamiyah's dissolution represents the culmination of a collective deradicalisation process, indicated by the cessation of violence, ideological correction, demilitarisation of clandestine and military structures, and the transition of former members' activities into legal social, educational, and religious domains. From a national security perspective, the dissolution has significantly reduced the operational threat of Jamaah Islamiyah as a structured terrorist organisation. However, it has not automatically eliminated residual challenges related to former members, affiliated educational institutions, social assets, and long-term ideological integration. Therefore, post-dissolution counterterrorism policy should move beyond repressive measures and emphasise sustained reintegration, early detection, institutional supervision, and socio-economic empowerment.

1. Introduction

Terrorism is one of the non-traditional threats that has direct implications for state stability, public safety, and the resilience of national institutions. In Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyah occupies an important position in the history of radicalism and terrorism because it once developed a structured network, a cadre base, transnational relations, and operational capacity for large-scale violence. Jamaah Islamiyah was formally established in early 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Hwang, 2019b). The ideological roots of JI are linked to the history of Darul Islam and the aspiration to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (Temby, 2010). The historical connection between Darul Islam and JI also indicates ideological continuity in the development of radical Islamist movements in Indonesia (Budd, 2014). In its development, the organisation adopted a gradual struggle structure through the General Guidelines for the Struggle of Jamaah Islamiyah, or PUPJI, which regulated organisational functions, cadre mechanisms, and an organised structure of struggle (Pavlova, 2007). This historical foundation explains JI as an organisation with systematic structures, ideology, and stages of struggle.

Historically, Jamaah Islamiyah developed not only as an ideological community, but also as a transnational radical network in Southeast Asia. The Mantiqi structure demonstrated JI's capacity to build cross-border networks for fundraising, logistics, recruitment, and military training (Hwang, 2019b). In the regional context, JI developed amid the challenge of radical interpretations of Islam in Southeast Asia, which were connected to broader cross-border dynamics (Desker, 2003). JI's regional network was also reflected in its relationship with groups such as *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* within the ecosystem of regional extremism (Abdullah, 2009). The Mantiqi IV connection indicated that JI's support network had attempted to reach external nodes beyond Indonesia, although not all of these efforts were consolidated effectively (Harris-Hogan & Zammit, 2014). Thus, JI should not be understood solely as a domestic phenomenon, but as an organisation with regional and transnational dimensions.

JI's record of violence reached its most prominent point in the 2002 Bali bombing, which killed 202 people and revealed a complex and efficiently organised social network structure (Koschade, 2006). JI's violent plots also demonstrate the importance of geography, globalisation, and cross-border movement in supporting the group's operations (Hastings, 2008). However, pressure from security forces, particularly after the 2007 operation in Poso, pushed JI to shift its strategy from violent activity towards dakwah and social network building (IPAC, 2017). This shift is an important starting point for understanding JI not as a static actor, but as an organisation that experienced strategic, institutional, and activity-oriented transformation.

Jamaah Islamiyah's transformation subsequently appeared through the strengthening of dakwah, education, social institutions, and fundraising activities that utilised legal spaces. The shift towards dakwah became an important feature of JI's behaviour because dakwah was positioned as an instrument for sustaining the network before the use of violence was again considered relevant (Hwang, 2019a). This transformation can also be explained as part of JI's adaptive strategy to maintain network continuity through dakwah-area mapping, the formation of educational cadres, and fundraising by raising humanitarian issues (IPAC, 2017). In terms of financing, JI shifted from illegal sources to legal mechanisms through individual donations and public fundraising framed in socio-humanitarian narratives (Anisa & Syauqillah, 2022). Therefore, the decline of violent attacks did not automatically mean the disappearance of the organisation's social and ideological infrastructure, as non-violent activities could still function as part of network preservation.

The culmination of this transformation occurred on 30 June 2024, when 16 senior figures of Jamaah Islamiyah declared the dissolution of the organisation and pledged loyalty to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. This decision did not emerge suddenly, but was influenced by security pressure, internal ideological evaluation, concerns over the confiscation of educational assets, and the encouragement of JI intellectuals to redirect the movement towards peaceful dakwah and legal social engagement (IPAC, 2024). The research findings indicate that the central declaration was subsequently followed by waves of local declarations through a dialogical approach involving security actors and relevant state institutions. These changes indicate that JI's dissolution in 2024 should be read as the outcome of a long organisational transformation, rather than as a sudden decision detached from previous organisational dynamics.

The dissolution of Jamaah Islamiyah cannot be understood as the end of all problems related to radicalism and terrorism. Formal dissolution may be positioned as an important turning point in reducing the threat of violence-based extremism. However, this process does not automatically eliminate ideological residues, social networks, cadre activities, network fragmentation, digital ideological propagation, and the possibility of more concealed threat patterns. In modern threat assessment, a potential threat does not always appear through open violence, but may also be rooted in social networks, community spaces, and informal institutionalisation (Akchurina & Lavorgna, 2014). The main research problem of this article focuses on the impact of JI's dissolution on the continuity of former JI members' activities and Indonesia's national security.

This article uses Omar Ashour's perspective of collective deradicalisation and Barry Buzan's concept of national security as its main analytical frameworks. Deradicalisation is used to examine changes at the ideological, behavioural, and organisational levels of JI after dissolution. National security is used to assess the implications of these changes for state stability, institutions, and society. Based on these frameworks, this article argues that the dissolution of Jamaah Islamiyah represents the culmination of a collective deradicalisation process that has significantly reduced the organisation's operational threat. Nevertheless,

it still requires state supervision because the transformation of former members involves not only the cessation of violence, but also social integration, ideological correction, institutional oversight, and socio-economic empowerment.

2. Method

This article employs a qualitative approach because the object of inquiry concerns ideological, social, organisational, and security dynamics that cannot be adequately explained through quantitative measurement (Creswell, 2003). A qualitative approach is used to understand the meaning of Jamaah Islamiyah's dissolution, the changing activities of former members, and its implications for national security in an in-depth and contextual manner. The temporal scope of the study is focused on the post-dissolution period from June 2024 to November 2025, with attention to the early dynamics of transition.

The research data consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained through in-depth interviews with former Jamaah Islamiyah members, law enforcement and intelligence officials, and academics or researchers who understand the dynamics of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. Secondary data were obtained through document studies of academic literature, government institutional reports, official government documents, court decisions, and credible online media articles. Data collection was conducted through in-depth interviews, indirect observation of former JI narratives and activities through mass media, social media, and online dakwah channels, as well as document study. Data analysis was conducted through data condensation, data display, conclusion drawing, and verification as used in the approach of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014). Data validity was strengthened through source and method triangulation, member checking, and an audit trail to ensure that the researcher's interpretation remained consistent with the data obtained.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. The Dissolution of Jamaah Islamiyah as Collective Deradicalisation

The declaration of Jamaah Islamiyah's dissolution on 30 June 2024 represents an important point in Indonesia's counterterrorism dynamics because it marked a shift in the position of an organisation with a long record of political violence. In Omar Ashour's deradicalisation framework, change among radical groups is not only viewed as individual change, but also as collective change at the movement or organisational level, particularly when a group revises its ideological orientation, delegitimises violence, and shifts towards non-violent means to pursue its political goals (Ashour, 2009). Based on this framework, JI's dissolution can be read as a form of collective deradicalisation because the changes involved behavioural, ideological, and organisational dimensions. The process flow of JI's dissolution is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The Process Flow of Jamaah Islamiyah's Dissolution

At the behavioural level, the research findings show that JI no longer maintains violence as an instrument of struggle in Indonesia. This change is reflected in the cessation of violent attacks since around 2009, the dissolution of tanzim askari and tanzim sirri, the submission of ALBAS, ideological correction through the book Tatharruf, and the Rumah Wasathiyah outreach process as a series of developments that shifted the organisation's orientation from armed confrontation towards legal social participation. In this

context, the cessation of violence is an important indicator because deradicalisation at the behavioural level requires a concrete change in the use of violence as an instrument of movement (Ashour, 2009). The process of JI's dissolution in Indonesia was also influenced by internal evaluation, security pressure, and the encouragement to redirect the struggle towards peaceful and legal dakwah (IPAC, 2024). The chronology of changes in JI's attitudes and behaviour is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Chronology of Changes in Jamaah Islamiyah's Attitudes and Behaviour

Period	Focus of Movement	Position
1993–2009	Terrorist attacks; military training	Confrontational
2009–2024	Cessation of terrorist attacks; strengthening of tanzim sirri; strengthening of dakwah, training, and cadre development agenda	Transitional
2024–present	Dakwah; education; legal activities	Demilitarisation and participation

At the ideological level, JI's dissolution was related to an internal evaluation of the relevance of the old struggle strategy and the encouragement of some JI intellectuals to redirect the organisation towards peaceful dakwah and legal social engagement. The declaration of JI's dissolution was influenced by security pressure, internal ideological evaluation, concerns over the confiscation of educational assets, and internal encouragement to pursue a more peaceful and legal dakwah path (IPAC, 2024). Therefore, JI's dissolution did not merely represent an administrative decision, but also reflected an attempt at ideological correction regarding the organisation's relationship with the state and society.

At the organisational level, the research findings show that the dissolution of formal structures and the demilitarisation of the network directly reduced JI's operational capacity. The dissolution of tanzim askari and tanzim sirri, the submission of strategic tools and materials, and the shift of activities into legal spaces indicate a significant institutional change within JI. This is important because a terrorist organisation does not operate only through ideology, but also through command structures, cadre systems, internal security mechanisms, and operational instruments. When the organisational structures that supported violent capacity were dismantled, the operational threat of the organisation also declined significantly.

Nevertheless, JI's collective deradicalisation cannot be simply interpreted as the end of all problems. Deradicalisation can be differentiated into pragmatic, substantive, and comprehensive types, depending on the depth of ideological, behavioural, and organisational change (Ashour, 2009). In the case of JI, the cessation of violence, ideological correction, structural dissolution, and declaration of loyalty to NKRI indicate movement towards a more substantive form of deradicalisation. However, the presence of former members, affiliated educational institutions, old social networks, and socio-economic integration needs indicates that the process still requires supervision so that it does not remain merely declarative. Thus, JI's dissolution is better understood as a transitional process towards collective deradicalisation that still requires social, ideological, and institutional consolidation.

3.2. Transformation of Former Jamaah Islamiyah Members' Activities after Dissolution

The main impact of JI's dissolution is reflected in the changing orientation of former members' activities. Before the declaration of dissolution, JI had already shifted its strategy from violent activity towards dakwah, education, social activities, and community network strengthening. This strategic shift after state pressure became evident after the 2007 operation in Poso, when the organisation began to focus more on dakwah and social network building (IPAC, 2017). After the declaration of dissolution, this transformation became stronger because former members no longer operated within the formal structure of a terrorist organisation, but were directed towards legal and open social spaces.

The transformation of former JI activities is visible in the fields of education and dakwah. The research findings show that educational institutions and foundations with historical links to JI can no longer be understood merely as bases of an underground organisation, but have become important objects in the processes of integration, guidance, and state supervision. Historically, JI used education, dakwah, and cadre

development as mechanisms for sustaining its socio-ideological network (Hwang, 2019b). JI's shift towards dakwah also shows that religious activity could become a strategic medium for sustaining organisational influence after pressure from the authorities (Hwang, 2019a). JI's strategic change after state pressure further demonstrates the organisation's shift towards dakwah and social network building (IPAC, 2017). Therefore, after dissolution, affiliated educational institutions need to be directed into legal governance, moderate curricula, and measurable guidance mechanisms.

The research findings also reveal two main patterns in the position of JI-affiliated educational institutions after dissolution. First, there is an emphasis on the legal-formal arrangement of foundations, registration and curriculum guidance under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the use of pesantren as partners in national insight programmes and other government programmes. Second, there is an emphasis on the continuing role of some pesantren as religious activity spaces for former JI members and as potential sites for the formation of a new generation of cadres that still requires special monitoring. In the context of Islamist education, recovering a non-violent identity in pesantren is important to ensure that educational spaces no longer become mediums for reproducing militancy (Hamdi et al., 2015). These two patterns show that JI-affiliated educational institutions cannot be read in a single way, as they may serve as channels of reintegration while also requiring supervision to prevent the conservation of old ideology.

Beyond education and dakwah, the transformation of former JI activities is also visible in their involvement in ideological correction and continuing guidance. The involvement of former JI figures in guidance programmes is important because internal figures have social legitimacy within the former jamaah community. The research findings show that institutional responses to JI's dissolution were carried out through dialogue, education, mentoring of former members, social integration, and continuing guidance. Through this approach, former JI members are not only treated as objects of supervision, but also as subjects who can be directed to support the transformation of their own community.

Another important change is the normalisation of relations between former JI members and the state. The research findings show that after dissolution, changes in relations began to emerge through declarations of loyalty to NKRI, dialogue with authorities, and involvement in guidance programmes. This relational shift is important because collective deradicalisation requires not only the cessation of violence, but also a change in how former members perceive the legitimacy of the state and national law. Therefore, the transformation of former JI members is not only behavioural, but also involves the political and social relationship between former members and the state.

Socio-economic activity is also an important part of the sustainability of former JI members' transformation. The research findings show that integration of former members cannot rely only on ideological and legal approaches, but must also address economic empowerment. Limited access to employment and economic opportunities may become a risk factor that hinders successful reintegration, particularly if former members lose old support networks without gaining adequate new socio-economic spaces. Therefore, the involvement of relevant ministries, institutions, and local governments in socio-economic empowerment is an important part of ensuring that the transformation of former JI members remains sustainable.

Thus, the transformation of former JI activities after dissolution shows a shift from clandestine structures towards legal activities in dakwah, education, social engagement, and the economy. However, the legality of activities does not automatically eliminate all ideological residues and old social networks. Therefore, educational institutions, foundations, dakwah forums, and social spaces involving former members must continue to be managed through guidance, supervision, and continuous evaluation. This is important so that JI's dissolution does not merely become a formal change, but generates social and institutional transformation that supports national security.

3.3. Implications for Indonesia's National Security

From Barry Buzan's perspective, national security is not limited to military defence, but also involves protection of the idea of the state, state institutions, and the physical base of the state, including territory, population, and resources (Buzan, 1983). Using this framework, the impact of JI's dissolution on national security can be read through two main dimensions: the reduction of the organisation's operational threat and the emergence of a residual management agenda after dissolution.

First, JI's dissolution significantly reduced the organisation's operational threat. The research findings show that the cessation of violence, structural demilitarisation, dissolution of clandestine networks, submission of strategic tools and materials, and shift of activities into legal spaces have reduced JI's capacity to carry out organised terrorist attacks. From a national security perspective, this condition has a positive impact because it reduces direct threats to state stability, public safety, and the resilience of security institutions. In other words, the state no longer faces JI as an active terrorist organisation with a centralised command structure and violent capacity.

Second, JI's dissolution shifted the counterterrorism paradigm from enforcement against an active organisation towards the management of former members' transformation. The research findings show that the state no longer faces only a terrorist organisational structure, but also a community of former members undergoing social, ideological, and institutional integration. This change is important because national security is not determined only by the success of dissolving an organisation, but also by the state's ability to ensure that former members do not return to old patterns. Therefore, guidance, supervision, and socio-economic empowerment become part of the national security agenda after dissolution.

Third, JI's dissolution still leaves residual challenges. The research findings show that these challenges do not primarily take the form of direct attacks controlled by a central organisation, but relate to ideological residues, the continuity of old social networks, the management of affiliated educational institutions, traces of foreign connections and military training experience, and the possibility of reactivation if integration fails. In modern threat assessment, threats may continue to exist through transnational connectivity, legal-informal spaces, and penetration into community social structures (Akchurina & Lavorgna, 2014). The residual threat after dissolution remains latent, with very low violent intent and limited but real capacity and opportunity. This potential may increase if triggered by communal conflict, escalation of global religious issues, or failure of socio-economic integration. Therefore, the post-dissolution threat should neither be exaggerated as an active operational threat nor dismissed as a completely absent residue.

Fourth, JI's dissolution also has implications for the protection of the idea of the state and institutional resilience. In Buzan's framework, national security is not only physical security, but also concerns the continuity of the idea of the state and the legitimacy of institutions (Buzan, 1983). The declaration of former JI members' loyalty to NKRI, involvement in dialogue with authorities, and shift of activities into legal spaces indicate an improved relationship between former members and the state. However, this achievement must be tested through long-term consistency, particularly in ideological guidance, supervision of educational institutions, and socio-economic integration.




Figure 2. Concept Map of the Impact of JI's Dissolution on Former Members Activities and National Security

Thus, the impact of JI's dissolution on national security is twofold. On the one hand, dissolution has significantly reduced the threat of organised terrorism. On the other hand, dissolution opens a new stage

involving the management of former members, affiliated institutions, social assets, and ideological residues so that they do not develop into new forms of threat. Therefore, national security after JI's dissolution requires an integrative approach that combines early detection, social guidance, ideological correction, institutional supervision, and economic empowerment. A synthesis of the impact of JI's dissolution on former members' activities and national security is presented in Figure 2.

3.4. JI's Dissolution as a Transition from Organisational Threat to Reintegration Agenda

Based on the discussion above, JI's dissolution should be understood as a transition from organisational threat towards a reintegration agenda. Before dissolution, the state faced JI as an organisation with a history of violence, cadre structures, socio-ideological networks, and operational capacity. After dissolution, the state faces a community of former members who no longer operate within a formal structure, but who still carry experiences, identities, social relations, and livelihood needs that must be managed sustainably.

This transition is important because counterterrorism success cannot be measured only by the disappearance of organisational structures. In the case of JI, the dissolution of structures has reduced violent capacity, but the sustainability of national security depends on the state's ability to ensure that former members do not return to old patterns. Therefore, the post-dissolution agenda should be directed towards three main aspects: the continuation of ideological correction, the arrangement of educational institutions and foundations within healthy legal governance, and the provision of realistic socio-economic spaces for former members.

The main contribution of this discussion lies in the understanding that the post-dissolution phase of a terrorist organisation is no less important than the enforcement phase. Thus, this article contributes to the understanding that the post-dissolution phase of a terrorist organisation should be treated as a distinct security phase, namely a phase in which operational threats decline, but reintegration, institutional supervision, and the management of ideological residues determine the sustainability of national security.

4. Conclusion

The declaration of Jamaah Islamiyah's dissolution on 30 June 2024 had a significant impact on the continuity of former members' activities and Indonesia's national security. The dissolution was not merely a formal event, but represented a collective deradicalisation process involving changes at the ideological, behavioural, and organisational levels. Indicators of this change include the cessation of violence, ideological correction, the dissolution of tanzim askari and tanzim sirri, the submission of strategic tools and materials, and the shift of former members' activities towards dakwah, education, social engagement, and legal integration.

In terms of the continuity of former members' activities, JI's dissolution changed the orientation from clandestine structures towards more open social activities. Former members no longer operate under the command of a formal terrorist organisation, but are directed towards the normalisation of relations with the state and society. However, this process still requires continuing guidance, particularly regarding educational institutions, social foundations, dakwah forums, and the socio-economic needs of former members.

From a national security perspective, JI's dissolution significantly reduced the organisation's operational threat. The state no longer faces JI as an active terrorist organisation with an organised command structure and violent capacity in Indonesia. However, dissolution does not automatically remove all security challenges. The main post-dissolution challenges lie in managing ideological residues, old social networks, affiliated institutions, and the risk of reactivation that may arise if integration fails or if triggered by communal conflicts with religious nuances and the escalation of global religious issues.

This article concludes that national security after the dissolution of Jamaah Islamiyah should be understood as a long-term agenda. Counterterrorism success is not determined only by the ability to dissolve an organisation, but also by the state's ability to ensure that the transformation of former members

proceeds in a substantive, measurable, and sustainable manner. Therefore, the state's approach must move from a paradigm of enforcement against an active terrorist organisation towards a model for managing the social, ideological, institutional, and economic transformation of former members within the framework of Indonesia's national security.

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