

Counter-Terrorism in the Nusantara National Capital City: A PPRR-Based Analysis of Cyber, Maritime, and Social Vulnerabilities

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Abstract

This study examines terrorism threats in the Nusantara National Capital City through the PPRR framework, namely prevention, preparation, response, and recovery, to identify key vulnerabilities and formulate an integrated counter-terrorism strategy. The article argues that terrorism in the new capital should not be understood merely as the possibility of physical attacks on the center of government, but as a multidimensional threat shaped by social vulnerabilities, land and governance issues, digital dependence arising from smart city development, and cross-border maritime exposure. Drawing on a descriptive qualitative design based on literature review and secondary data, the study shows that the security challenges of the Nusantara National Capital City are closely linked to local social grievances, cyber risks targeting Internet of Things-based critical infrastructure, and maritime-terrorism risks associated with the Sulu-Sulawesi corridor. The analysis further finds that effective counterterrorism in the Nusantara National Capital City cannot be pursued through sectoral measures alone, but requires the integration of pentahelix-based deradicalization, cyber resilience centered on local CSIRT and national BSSN coordination, and strengthened maritime defense through patrols, UAVs, and surveillance of strategic sea routes. It concludes that the security of the new capital will be more robust if cyber, maritime, and social threats are treated not as separate policy problems, but as mutually connected layers within a sustainable national security design.

1. Introduction

National security is one of the essential aspects of maintaining the stability and continuity of a state. The stability of a state can be determined or assessed by the extent to which threats are minimized, whether in terms of national security or the national economy. Terrorism remains one of the persistent challenges facing Indonesia, the world's largest archipelagic state. The potential threat of terrorism in Indonesia is highly diverse and may have broad impacts across various sectors of social life. Terror threats in Indonesia may come from various sources and target a range of objects. Given its social, political, and religious diversity, Indonesia has become a potential target for radical and terrorist groups. These threats may take the form of bomb attacks, armed assaults, cyberattacks, and other forms of terrorist activity.

The series of terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001, also known as 9/11, and the terrorist attack in Indonesia, namely the 2002 Bali Bombing, marked important moments in history and serve as only a few examples among many terrorist attacks demonstrating that terrorism is not an issue confined to a single region or continent, but has become a global problem that demands serious

attention. Advances in technology and information have certainly contributed to the increasing success of terrorist groups in carrying out attacks and recruiting new members. The use of extreme violence in terrorist attacks inevitably causes both material and immaterial losses for victims, including damage to government and private property, psychological impacts, and threats to the political and social stability of the state (Leach, 2003; Lestari, 2012; Riedel, 2007).

Although many assume that Indonesia has faced terrorism threats only since the early 2000s, the reality is that terror, in the form of threats to the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and its legitimate government, has existed since the early years of independence. These threats emerged in various forms of rebellion and separatist movements. Separatist movements generally carried out direct attacks against the central government, as well as other actions such as sabotage, kidnapping, and acts that disrupted public order (Bakti, 2014; Windiani, 2017). It can therefore be said that 2002 marked the beginning of terrorist attacks that have left a particularly deep impression in Indonesia.

Several terrorist incidents that have occurred in Indonesia include the Bali Bombings I and II in 2002 and 2005, various terror attacks in Poso in 2006, the suicide bombings at the Ritz Carlton and JW Marriott hotels in Jakarta in 2009, the robbery of CIMB Niaga Bank in Medan in 2010, the series of attacks in Sarinah in 2016, the pressure cooker bombing at Taman Pandawa Cicendo in 2017, the Mako Brimob tragedy in 2018, and several other acts of terrorism, most of which targeted security personnel (POLRI) or places of worship such as churches (Maulida, 2017). Based on the report issued by BNPT in 2022, the trend of terrorism threats over the previous five years was quite fluctuating according to data from the Global Terrorism Index. The data indicate that the threat level increased in 2019, declined in 2020, and rose again in 2022. According to GTI 2023, Indonesia did not experience either an increase or a decline, meaning that it remained in the same position as in 2022. In 2023, however, Indonesia experienced an increase (BNPT, 2022; The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022, 2023, 2024).

According to (Primoratz, 1990), terrorism is the deliberate use of violence or the threat of violence against innocent people with the aim of intimidating them, or others, into doing something they otherwise would not do. Referring to Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2018, terrorism is defined as follows:

“Terrorism is any act involving the use of violence or threats of violence that creates an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, that may cause mass casualties, and/or result in damage to or destruction of strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities, motivated by ideology, politics, or security disruption.” (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 2018).

In respond to the dynamics of terrorism threats, security efforts have often focused only on major cities or the principal capital, such as Jakarta. However, with the relocation to the new national capital, Indonesia will inevitably face new challenges in safeguarding the new center of government. As Indonesia's capital, Jakarta has long played an important role as the center of government, culture, and the national economy. The persistent problems faced by Jakarta, such as population density, traffic congestion, flooding, air pollution, and others, have encouraged the government to realize the relocation of the capital outside Java. The idea of relocating the capital was initially introduced by President Soekarno, was later discussed again during the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and was eventually realized under President Joko Widodo in 2019. In addressing the various problems and challenges faced by Jakarta, the capital was ultimately relocated from DKI Jakarta to East Kalimantan with the aim of promoting more equitable development that is not Java-centric and reducing the burden on the city of Jakarta (Dai Robby et al., 2024; Nainggolan, 2022).

It is undeniable that the relocation to the Nusantara National Capital City will inevitably create new potential threats. Alongside the development of the Nusantara National Capital City in East Kalimantan, attention has also been directed toward the security and stability of the region. As a new center of government, the Nusantara National Capital City has the potential to become a strategic target for terrorism threats. On the island of Kalimantan itself, particularly in areas close to the Nusantara National Capital City, several terrorist incidents have occurred. One example is the Molotov bomb attack in front of the Oikumene Church in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, which injured four people. This incident occurred on 13 November 2016 at 10:00 WITA, after the church congregation had finished worship. Based on the evidence collected by the police, it was concluded that the perpetrator was affiliated with ISIS (Amelia, 2016; N. Sari, 2016). Then, in 2021, POLRI arrested three terrorist suspects in East Kalimantan who were affiliated with MIT

Poso. These three individuals were tasked with assisting in funding, bomb-making training, and social media training for MIT Poso (Litha, 2021). In 2023, Densus 88 AT also arrested a terrorist suspect in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, who was affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah. This terrorist suspect, identified by the initials IAZ, served as the treasurer of the group (Naibaho, 2023).

With the Nusantara National Capital City located near the national border, and given its position in North Kalimantan, the area constitutes a strategic location for the spread of radicalism and terrorism threats. This is due to the existence of the Sulu, Sabah, and Poso Triangle, which makes it necessary to direct greater attention to buffer cities such as Samarinda and Balikpapan, both of which are highly likely to become destination cities for cross-border terrorism (Apriliasari & Priyanto, 2024; Hanita, 2018). Furthermore, considering the terrorist incidents and arrests carried out by the police in areas near the Capital City of Nusantara, it is important to identify effective prevention strategies in order to maintain the stability and security of the new capital against terrorism threats.

2. Method

This journal article employs a descriptive qualitative research design, using a literature review as the data collection technique. The author collects and analyzes secondary data drawn from books, journal articles, and credible news reports published up to the end of 2024. These sources are used to examine and describe terrorism prevention strategies that can be implemented in the Nusantara National Capital City. The analysis of the secondary data is conducted through the PPRR approach, or the PPRR Framework (prevention, preparation, response, and recovery), as outlined by Prunckun.

3. PPRR Framework

Prunckun explains that threat analysis is the first of three integrated phases used in developing a counterterrorism plan, followed by vulnerability analysis and risk analysis, and that the results of these three analytical stages lay the groundwork for formulating programs that address prevention, preparation, response, and recovery (PPRR). In this sense, PPRR should not be understood merely as a reactive framework for dealing with incidents after they occur, but as part of a broader analytical process that begins with identifying the nature of the threat, the vulnerabilities that may be exploited, the likelihood of occurrence, and the consequences that may follow. More specifically, Prunckun summarizes this process in five steps, identifying the threat, exploring vulnerabilities to the threat, gauging the likelihood that the threat will materialize, assessing its consequences, and then constructing a PPRR plan (Prunckun, 2014; Prunckun & Whitford, 2018).

Within this framework, PPRR stands for prevention, preparation, response, and recovery. Prevention refers to efforts to consider risks and implement measures that could stop a threat from occurring. Preparation acknowledges that, despite preventive efforts, a threatening event may still take place, and therefore institutions must remain prepared to face that possibility. Response refers to the part of the plan that addresses how agencies or relevant institutions will mobilize and take action, including the type of action they will undertake once an attack is under way or has occurred. Recovery, meanwhile, provides guidance for recovery operations after the event has been contained and ended, recognizing that preventive measures may have failed and preparatory measures may only have reduced the impact to a certain extent. An important aspect of Prunckun's framework is that these four elements, although presented sequentially, are not rigidly separated in practice. He emphasizes that the elements of PPRR may be implemented simultaneously, and that response and recovery often begin at the same time because they are closely and operationally interconnected. This point is important because it shows that PPRR is not a linear formula, but a flexible planning framework that can be adapted to dynamic and evolving threat situations (Prunckun, 2014; Prunckun & Whitford, 2018).

This framework is particularly relevant for the present study because the analysis of terrorism threats in Nusantara National Capital City requires more than a simple identification of possible threats. It also requires an examination of the vulnerabilities surrounding the new capital, an assessment of how likely those threats are to materialize, an evaluation of their possible consequences, and, based on that assessment, the formulation of strategies for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. That logic is fully consistent with Prunckun's approach, which places PPRR within a broader counterterrorism

planning process rather than treating it as a stand-alone emergency response model. Furthermore, the framework is suitable for this research because the terrorism threat in NCC is multidimensional. It is not limited to one form of risk, but potentially includes social vulnerabilities, cyber threats, and cross-border or maritime dimensions. In such a context, the PPRR framework provides a useful structure for organizing the analysis comprehensively, from anticipatory measures and preparedness arrangements to operational response and post-incident recovery. Since Prunckun also notes that this planning approach should consider broader all-hazards thinking, the framework allows the analysis to remain sufficiently flexible while still being focused on counterterrorism (Prunckun, 2014; Prunckun & Whitford, 2018).

4. Results and Discussion

There are several reasons underlying the relocation of Indonesia's capital from Jakarta to the Nusantara National Capital City, located in East Kalimantan. One of these reasons is the high population density on the island of Java, where 50.10% of Indonesia's population resides. This is also related to the massive growth of urbanization on Java, particularly in areas near the capital such as Depok, Tangerang, Bogor, Bekasi, Puncak, and the Cianjur area. Java also made the largest contribution to national GDP in 2021, reflecting its economic dominance and contribution. In addition, the problem of clean water availability on the island of Java has become one of the main reasons for relocating the capital. This is compounded by the disaster risks faced by Jakarta, such as landslides, flooding, high levels of pollution both in the air and in various rivers, coastal abrasion, and traffic congestion (Purnama & Chotib, 2023).

The relocation of the capital to the island of Kalimantan represents an effort to realize more equitable development within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia under the leadership of President Joko Widodo, who has long argued that development in Indonesia has often been Java-centric. Therefore, the relocation to Kalimantan is an effort to rebalance Indonesia's economic development so that it also encompasses eastern Indonesia. Based on the supporting factors described in the previous paragraph, Nusantara was ultimately designated as the new name of Indonesia's capital, and the development of this capital was approved by President Jokowi. The development area covers 180,000 hectares of land in North Penajam Paser and Kutai Kartanegara in East Kalimantan (H. I. Lubis et al., 2023).

The Nusantara National Capital City will be developed under the concepts of a Smart City based on the Internet of Things (IoT), a forest city, and a green city. With the relocation of the national capital to East Kalimantan, the government hopes to reduce Jakarta's burden and promote more equitable development outside Java (H. I. Lubis et al., 2023). However, the relocation of the capital also brings new challenges, including in the areas of security and defense, given that the new center of government may become a strategic target for various threats. The potential threats associated with the status of the Nusantara National Capital City as a national symbol vary, ranging from relatively general threats such as threats to infrastructure, cyber threats, and social conflict, to more specific threats such as terrorist attacks. (T. M. Lubis et al., 2024) also state that several obstacles may later develop into potential threats in the Nusantara National Capital City. The limited involvement of local communities in the development of the Nusantara National Capital City remains an issue, particularly in land provision and land security arrangements that have not fully embraced the participation of local residents and community leaders. This lack of inclusiveness indicates that land management in the Nusantara National Capital City has not been optimal in involving surrounding communities as part of the planning process. In addition, some community groups still regard the capital relocation project merely as a political agenda rather than a national necessity. This, in turn, creates doubts regarding the smooth implementation and sustainability of the project. (Warsilah, 2023) also argues that development in the Nusantara National Capital City has caused the social exclusion of local residents from their own customary land, and that the limited encouragement of local community participation in policy consultations may lead to social unrest.

The development of the Nusantara National Capital City not only creates administrative and spatial planning challenges, but also has the potential to generate social grievances if local communities feel excluded from the decision-making process, lose access to land, or do not receive proportional benefits from development. Such conditions must be understood from a security perspective, because unaddressed social discontent can create an opening for radical actors to construct anti-government narratives, reinforce perceptions of injustice, and attract sympathy from groups that feel marginalized. This argument is consistent with the study by Firmansyah et al., which emphasizes that deradicalization programs cannot be separated from the local social context, the history of conflict, and the needs of the target community.

Therefore, the prevention of radicalization must begin with an understanding of the roots of social grievances, rather than solely from ideological expressions that have already fully developed (Firmansyah et al., 2022). (Kurnia et al., 2023) also emphasize that the potential for radicalism in Indonesia cannot be adequately addressed through law enforcement alone, but requires cross-sectoral efforts that engage social, educational, economic, and media dimensions.

Another issue concerns the safeguarding of land assets in the Nusantara National Capital City, as this clearly affects the security of the area, especially in the core government zone, which to this day has not officially been designated as a National Vital Object as of the end of 2024. The absence of this status has made it difficult for the Mulawarman Regional Military Command and the East Kalimantan Regional Police to carry out their duties optimally, particularly regarding operational budgets and personnel mobilization. The fact that large areas of land within the Core Government Center of the Nusantara National Capital City remain under community control gives rise to several potential threats to the security and stability of development. Prolonged land acquisition problems may create social conflict among community groups, which may also trigger dissatisfaction among people who lose their livelihoods without being provided with replacement land. This situation, combined with uncertainty regarding land sale and purchase permits for local communities, may weaken their support for the development of the Nusantara National Capital City, which in turn may increase vulnerability to social disturbances or public protests. From an institutional perspective, the slow pace of cooperation among government agencies in managing land in the Nusantara National Capital City creates additional risks. Delays in land management and licensing for investors, for example, have the potential to hamper security efforts, especially in important or vital areas, particularly given that the Nusantara National Capital City has not yet obtained official status as a National Vital Object (T. M. Lubis et al., 2024).

Research conducted by (Marzuki et al., 2023) states that the Nusantara National Capital City is quite vulnerable to hydrometeorological disasters because of its location on the equator and its high rainfall levels. Although total rainfall has declined over the past two decades, the intensity of extreme rainfall events has in fact increased, resulting in a higher flood risk. This overall decline in total rainfall also has the potential to affect the availability of clean water and to increase drought and forest fires during the dry season. (Syaban & Appiah-Opoku, 2024) state in their study that socio-economic and environmental conflicts may arise due to the transition from natural vegetation and agricultural land to urban infrastructure built in the area of the Nusantara National Capital City. This may affect biodiversity, local resilience, and local livelihoods.

In addition to the potential threats related to land, social conditions, and natural factors as described above, it is undeniable that there are also potential security threats in the area of the Nusantara National Capital City. These threats may take the form of direct security threats or indirect threats, such as those found in cyberspace. Terrorism is an extraordinary crime that has the capacity to threaten security both directly and through cyberspace, which is also known as cyberterrorism. argue that there has been a shift in contemporary terrorism threats, from traditional forms to cyber technology-based attacks. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that terrorist actors will completely abandon traditional approaches. According to the 2021 BNPT report, during the COVID-19 pandemic terrorist groups maximized their online activities for the purposes of recruiting new members, fundraising, and spreading propaganda.

The implementation of a smart city in the Capital City of Nusantara means that everything is internet-based. The digital infrastructure that serves as the backbone of the smart city in the Capital City of Nusantara could become a target for cyberattacks carried out either by lone-wolf terrorists or by terrorist groups, with the aim of disrupting the stability of the Indonesian government. As most government activities and public services shift to digital platforms, there are clearly gaps or potential security vulnerabilities within the infrastructure of the Capital City of Nusantara that may become strategic targets for cyberterrorist individuals or groups seeking to create chaos or fear within society. In this context, cyberattacks may take the form of hacking government communication systems, or even the government system as a whole, which is already digitally based. They may also involve the manipulation of important data, as well as the disabling of public services, which would not only disrupt the flow of public services but also undermine public confidence in the state's ability to maintain cybersecurity at the new center of government.

Research conducted by (Djenna et al., 2021) shows that Internet of Things-based critical infrastructure is an attractive target because its vulnerabilities are spread across interconnected devices, software, data communications, and services, meaning that a single weak point can trigger cascading disruptions across broader public functions. Bokhari and Myeong (2023) also emphasize that, within the smart city concept, the cybersecurity of digital government is heavily influenced by stakeholder involvement and governance capacity, which means that cyber threats must be understood as a governance problem, not merely a software problem. The experience of several cities abroad shows that cyber disruptions affecting local governments can quickly turn into public service crises. For example, in Baltimore, a ransomware attack crippled government email systems and online payment services and locked 10,000 city government computers, while residents were unable to pay water bills, property taxes, and parking fines online. The Redcar and Cleveland case is even more relevant to the logic of smart governance because the 2020 attack disrupted social services and information sharing with the police and health services, forced employees to return to manual systems, and required 10 months for full recovery at a total response cost of £11.3 million. These facts show that attacks on a city's digital systems not only create administrative disruption, but can also damage public trust, reduce institutional response capacity, and heighten the perception that the state is unable to protect the new center of government (BBC, 2019; BBC Local Investigations, 2025).

The issue of social vulnerability described in the previous paragraphs, namely that local communities are often not involved in policymaking or development processes, may increase the risk of social conflict that can be exploited by separatist terrorist movements. Such groups may attempt to penetrate or influence communities that feel marginalized. They may seek to reinforce anti-government sentiment or even provoke larger-scale movements or protests. If such dissatisfaction is not addressed promptly, it may become an entry point for groups that oppose the existence of, or the relocation of the capital to, the Capital City of Nusantara, or it may be exploited by actors with opposing political interests. Any form of disruption and decline in public confidence or foreign investor confidence is clearly one of the consequences of the inability to shield the Capital City of Nusantara from threats arising in both digital and physical forms. Given the geographical condition of the Nusantara National Capital City, Indonesia has long faced threats from strategic terrorism, particularly along strategic maritime routes. Terrorist groups in this region possess both the capability and the motive to target commercial ports and cargo shipping ports, which may have implications for the Capital City of Nusantara given its coastal location (Raymond, 2006).

In applying the PPRR framework, terrorism prevention strategies in the Nusantara National Capital City may include the following. At the prevention stage, it is first necessary to identify what kinds of threats, or what kinds of terrorism threats, have the potential to occur in the Nusantara Capital City. As explained in the previous paragraphs, potential terrorism threats may include terrorism driven by separatist movements arising from conflict or social unrest, as well as cyberterrorist attacks, given that the Nusantara National Capital City is being developed on the basis of a smart city. One example is the dissolution of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization, supported by Densus 88 on 3 July 2024, along with its declaration of recognition of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (A. R. Sari, 2024). The dissolution of this terrorist organization constitutes one form of prevention, as it can minimize and limit their room to continue operating. With the disbandment of JI, the potential for terrorist attacks and the emergence of new terrorist elements is reduced. Preventive action may also be achieved through deradicalization and counter-narrative programs carried out by relevant institutions. Deradicalization programs are directed toward terrorism convicts and former terrorism convicts, while counter-narratives are directed toward the wider public, including former terrorism convicts. Research conducted by (Subagyo, 2021) recommends a deradicalization program based on the pentahelix model involving academics, society, government, business, and the media. The involvement of business actors and the media plays a very important role in the optimal implementation of deradicalization programs. By using the pentahelix model, the success of deradicalization programs can be encouraged because collaboration among the government, civil society, and academics can transform the beliefs of terrorism convicts toward more tolerant and humanistic teachings and influences, while also severing their ties with previous terrorist networks.

In the context of the Nusantara National Capital City, deradicalization is important not only because of the presence of terrorism convicts or former terrorism convicts, but also because the new capital is a space of very rapid social transformation and therefore has the potential to generate new tensions among the state, migrants, investors, and local communities. When social change moves more quickly than the capacity for social integration, radical propaganda can more easily enter through narratives of injustice, marginalization, and distrust of the state. Therefore, in the context of the Nusantara National Capital City,

deradicalization must be understood as a social prevention mechanism aimed at closing recruitment opportunities before they develop into terrorism threats, rather than merely as a post-arrest program. Such an approach is consistent with the literature that places deradicalization as part of a collaborative, contextual, and sustainable strategy encompassing early identification, psychological adjustment, and aftercare (Firmansyah et al., 2022).

Based on research conducted by (Onapajo & Ozden, 2023) on the deradicalization program implemented by the Nigerian government against the Boko Haram terrorist group, which employed a non-military strategy in confronting terrorism threats, counter-narratives also play an important role in preventing terrorist threats, especially in combating terrorism motivated by religion or ideology. Effective counter-narratives aim to deconstruct extremist ideology and facilitate the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants and victims of violent extremism. (Subagyo, 2021) also argues that, given that social media can freely disseminate narratives of intolerance and radicalism that may encourage an individual or former terrorism convict to re-enter terrorist networks, the role of the media community is urgently needed. The aim is to provide positive narratives and improve digital literacy in cyberspace, so that former terrorism convicts can be equipped with strong knowledge and are not easily influenced by incitement or provocation from their previous terrorist groups.

From a legal framework perspective, Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism aims to increase the effectiveness and relevance of the law in responding to the evolving development of terrorism. One important point in this law is the affirmation of the death penalty as a punishment for perpetrators of terrorist crimes. This law also regulates further provisions regarding terrorism financing and emphasizes stronger law enforcement measures against perpetrators of terrorist crimes by granting additional authority to law enforcement officials. The law also addresses counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs as preventive and countermeasures against terrorism threats in Indonesia. Through this law, Densus 88 has the authority to arrest suspects or members of terrorist organizations before they must first carry out terrorist acts. Law Number 5 of 2018 amending Law Number 15 of 2003 on the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism juncto Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 expands the definition and scope of terrorist crimes, including criminal acts committed through cyberspace, and grants additional authority to law enforcement officials to conduct wiretapping of suspected electronic communications devices. As stated in Article 1 paragraph 2, which defines terrorism, and Article 31A, which discusses how investigators may first conduct wiretapping of persons strongly suspected of preparing, planning, and/or carrying out criminal acts of terrorism, it can be said that in addressing cyberterrorism, this law can serve as a basis for criminal sanctions.

Prevention of terrorism threats in the Nusantara National Capital City may also include measures such as monitoring vital locations through modern surveillance technologies, such as CCTV, and cybersecurity systems to prevent internet-based threats. In addition, training and public outreach for communities and security personnel should be enhanced in order to increase awareness of potential threats and how to address them. Strengthening physical security at strategic locations is also an important focus, including the protection of critical infrastructure such as airports, stations, and shopping centers.

At the preparation stage, this includes planning, training, and the allocation of state resources to ensure an effective response to potential terrorism threats. (Sulo et al., 2022) argue that it is important for Indonesia to have a comprehensive border security strategy in order to avoid and mitigate various dangers originating from border areas. The use of UAVs, or unmanned aircraft operations, is one of the main priorities in realizing the mission of increasing surveillance in border areas, with the aim of protecting and meeting security needs in the airspace of those regions. The use of UAVs can minimize the potential threat of modern terrorism carried out through drone attacks. Through the use of UAVs, Indonesia can not only maintain the air defense of the Nusantara National Capital City, but also use them as tools for surveillance and reconnaissance against individuals suspected of being affiliated with relevant terrorist organizations.

The strengthening of border surveillance through UAVs must be directly connected to the character of maritime threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi region. Research on Sangihe and Talaud shows that the Indonesia-Philippines border area has been used as a mobility route for terrorist groups, including for the movement of actors in and out of the region and the circulation of weapons for terrorist activities in eastern Indonesia. Accordingly, the use of UAVs in areas surrounding the Nusantara National Capital City is relevant not only

for general air patrols, but also for supporting early detection of suspicious movement patterns along maritime and border routes connected to Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and the waters of the southern Philippines. In this logic, threats to the Nusantara National Capital City do not arise solely from direct attacks on the center of government, but also from transnational flows moving through maritime corridors and then entering Indonesia's land territory (Niode et al., 2021; Putra, 2018).

As a new center of government located in East Kalimantan and connected to the strategic sea lanes of eastern Indonesia, the Nusantara National Capital City requires a maritime defense strategy that is oriented not only toward coastal protection, but also toward closing transnational routes that may be exploited for weapons smuggling, terrorist mobility, and disruptions to ports or logistics distribution. Hudaya and Putra argue that Indonesia's maritime security still has many gaps, especially in confronting non-traditional threats such as piracy and maritime terrorism, so strengthening patrols, fleets, and surveillance based on satellites or drones has become a strategic necessity. This vulnerability is even more apparent in the Sulu-Sulawesi region, which Maolana and Prakasa identify as one of the maritime routes in Asia most vulnerable to maritime terrorism. They also emphasize that Abu Sayyaf uses kidnapping to obtain ransom when under financial pressure, meaning that illegal maritime activity in this region is not merely a maritime security issue, but is also directly linked to terrorism financing. AP News reinforces this picture by showing that in 2016 a total of 24 Indonesian citizens were kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf, and that this series of incidents prompted discussions on strengthening joint patrols among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Karmini, 2016; Putra, 2018). In respond of this vulnerability, (Hasan & Haeran, 2023) emphasize the importance of involving maritime economic actors, especially fishers, as maritime social monitors who can convey initial information regarding suspicious activities, smuggling, or territorial violations to the nearest authorities. In the context of the Nusantara National Capital City, this approach is relevant as a complement to formal patrols because it expands early detection capacity along the sea routes surrounding the new capital and strengthens the maritime defense system in a more participatory manner.

At this stage, preparations for addressing threats in the Nusantara National Capital City may also involve the development of preparedness through intensive training for security personnel, strengthening infrastructure, and developing early warning systems. These efforts include coordination among relevant institutions to strengthen response capacity and to formulate joint protocols for dealing with various terrorism attack scenarios. Simulation exercises are conducted regularly to ensure the readiness of emergency response teams.

At the response stage, coordination among institutions needs to be evaluated and strengthened. In this regard, coordination involving the public, the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN), the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police, the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), and the Ministry of Communication and Information is necessary in order to detect and provide the best and most effective response to such threats. Indonesia has initiated a national cybersecurity strategy that includes both short-term and long-term programs. However, challenges remain in the implementation of this program, such as constraints in governance and inter-agency coordination (Masyhar & Emovwodo, 2023). Research conducted by (Haidar et al., 2021) states that, in terms of cybersecurity infrastructure, the establishment of Computer Security Incident Response Teams, or CSIRTs, by BSSN aims to improve responses to cybersecurity incidents. However, the effectiveness of CSIRT services in Indonesia has not yet developed significantly, so improvements in management and updated practices are still needed within this infrastructure. The National Cybersecurity Strategy also emphasizes the importance of an integrated, collaborative, and flexible National Action Plan for cybersecurity (Praditya et al., 2023).

Cross-institutional coordination in addressing cyber threats in the Nusantara National Capital City will be stronger if it is explained through a clear relationship between CSIRT at the operational level and BSSN at the national level. In this scheme, a CSIRT for the Nusantara National Capital City could function as a rapid response unit closely connected to public service operators and the capital's digital infrastructure, while BSSN would serve as the national coordinator for standardization, response integration, threat information exchange, and cross-sector policy harmonization. The literature on counter-cyberterrorism in Indonesia emphasizes that BSSN was established precisely because previous sectoral approaches were not sufficiently coordinated, and that BSSN must work together with the TNI, the Indonesian National Police, BIN, the Ministry of Communication and Information, and other stakeholders to prevent and respond to cyberattacks by both state and non-state actors (Masyhar & Emovwodo, 2023). Therefore, in the case of the Nusantara National Capital City, the discussion of cybersecurity will be more convincing if it shows that

incident response does not stop at the establishment of a CSIRT, but must be connected to a national architecture led by BSSN.

This response stage may also take the form of deploying Densus 88 personnel and the TNI to areas used as hideouts and/or operational bases by terrorist groups. The deployment of these personnel is intended to arrest perpetrators and disable terrorist organizations that have carried out attacks, as a form of the state's response in maintaining national security. This stage also requires a rapid and coordinated response from emergency response teams. Emergency response procedures include evacuation, medical treatment for victims, and securing the scene so that evidence is not damaged and further threats can be prevented. Cross-institutional cooperation is key to handling this situation effectively, including investigative efforts to identify the perpetrators and the motives behind the attack.

At the final stage, namely recovery, the recovery stage aims to reduce the long-term impact of terrorist attacks, both on victims and on society more broadly. This process involves restoring damaged infrastructure, providing psychological support services for victims and their families, and undertaking social rehabilitation. Collaboration among the government, society, and the private sector is essential to ensure the success of the recovery process, including in providing logistical assistance and reintegrating victims into society. At this stage, efforts to restore affected communities and infrastructure after terrorist attacks in the area of the Capital City of Nusantara may include various initiatives, including psychological support and the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. Direct intervention at the scene and short-term psychological stabilization following a terrorist attack are important measures, while long-term psychotherapeutic approaches are also greatly needed to address the mental health problems faced by victims after experiencing such incidents. Psychiatrists or psychologists can serve as valuable consultants in community recovery and can help design and implement effective psychological support programs for victims and their surroundings (Miller, 2011).

The rehabilitation of former terrorists may also be carried out at this stage through economic empowerment, with the aim of helping reduce radicalism and improve their economic welfare. This form of economic rehabilitation is already included within deradicalization programs. Through this program, change is generated by encouraging individuals to disengage from terrorism, in contrast to programs that prioritize changing thought or ideology. The use of economic programs is implemented through empowerment, training, and economic opportunities with the aim of helping former terrorism convicts recover economically (Milla, 2012; Rukmono, 2020)

Terrorism threats in the Nusantara National Capital City cannot be understood partially, because cyber vulnerabilities, maritime threats, and social-radicalization issues are interconnected. Cyberattacks on public services, communication networks, or smart city sensor systems may weaken the state's surveillance, coordination, and response capacity at the very same moment when maritime routes open space for the movement of actors, logistics, and weapons across borders (Djenna et al., 2021; Niode et al., 2021; Roberts, 2019). Contemporary security approaches also show that threats such as terrorism, cyberattacks, smuggling, and cross-border disruptions are no longer suited to being addressed within separate sectoral compartments. (Givens et al., 2018) emphasize that contemporary threats are transnational in nature and that, for this reason, border security, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity must be understood as a single, mutually reinforcing policy framework.

On that basis, the counterterrorism strategy for the Nusantara National Capital City needs to be built on three integrated layers. The first layer is smart city resilience through the protection of digital public services, a local CSIRT, and national coordination with BSSN. The second layer is maritime defense through patrols, UAVs, base strengthening, and surveillance of the Sulu-Sulawesi route. The third layer is pentahelix-based deradicalization aimed at closing the social base of recruitment, addressing local grievances, and maintaining social integration in the area of the new capital (Firmansyah et al., 2022; Masyhar & Emovwodo, 2023; Putra, 2018).

5. Conclusion

Terrorism threats in the Nusantara National Capital City cannot be understood solely as the possibility of physical attacks on the center of government, but rather as multidimensional threats involving social vulnerabilities, digital dependence, and a geopolitical position that is exposed to cross-border flows. Therefore, the counter-terrorism strategy for the Nusantara National Capital City must be situated within

an integrated PPRR framework, with prevention based on deradicalization and counter-narratives, preparedness through the strengthening of cyber and maritime surveillance, response supported by inter-agency coordination and CSIRT-BSSN integration, and recovery encompassing psychological, social, and economic rehabilitation. Accordingly, the security of the Nusantara National Capital City will be stronger if the state does not separate cyber, maritime, and social threats into different policy compartments, but instead unifies them within a layered and sustainable national security design.

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